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ABSTRACT
THE CONCEPT OF INTRINSIC GOODNESS: ESSAYS IN MOOREAN
MORAL PHILOSOPHY
SEPTEMBER 2017
MILES TUCKER
B.A., NEW MEXICO STATE UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Fred Feldman

I defend and explicate a Moorean program in value theory. I claim that intrinsic goodness is
the fundamental concept of axiology, and argue that the notion should be understood as
G.E. Moore suggested in the Principia Ethica. In the first half of my manuscript, I address
popular challenges to the Moorean project, including objections raised by Judith Jarvis
Thomson, Shelly Kagan, and Christine Korsgaard. After, I turn to explication: I attend to the
connection between goodness and other normative notions, and present what I take to be
the most attractive version of the Moorean view. Finally, I address a perennial puzzle in
Moorean axiology: the nature and existence of value pluralism.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

My dissertation consists of six self-contained essays. In conjunction, they defend and
explicate a Moorean program in value theory. I take this program to consist of two claims:
(i): Intrinsic value is the fundamental concept of axiology.
(ii): The intrinsic value of a thing depends only on its intrinsic features. Further, such
value is essential to its bearers, persists in isolation, and attaches only to finelygrained entities, such as states of affairs.
These claims fix the subject matter of axiology. We may say that the axiologist’s fundamental
task is to assign intrinsic values to states of affairs—or, equivalently, to rank states of affairs
according to the intrinsically better than relation.
This conception of value theory has been nearly universally accepted since the
publication of Moore’s work. But it is increasingly challenged, or even rejected outright. The
first half of my manuscript is dedicated strictly to defense: I aim to show that the most
powerful objections to the orthodox Moorean program do not succeed. After, I turn to
explication: I attend to the relations between intrinsic goodness and other normative
concepts; I attempt to formulate the most plausible form of Moore’s original principles; and
I examine puzzles about the bearers of intrinsic value.
Below I summarize my six essays, and explain how they advance these goals.

Chapter 2: Simply Good: A Defense of the Principia
Some philosophers reject the Moorean program because they believe that nothing is
intrinsically good. Most point to Judith Jarvis Thomson; she says that Moorean axiology (and
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Moorean moral philosophy more broadly) goes wrong because “there is no such thing as
goodness.” I argue that her objection does not succeed: while Thomson is correct that the
kind of generic goodness she targets is incoherent, it is not, I believe, the kind of goodness
central to the Moorean project. I then address other motivations for such nihilism about
intrinsic goodness; I claim they are unfounded.

Chapter 3: The Pen, the Dress, and the Coat: A Confusion in Goodness
Some accept the existence of intrinsic goodness, but deny its normative significance.
Conditionalists claim that the final value of a thing—the value it has for its own sake or as an
end—may be conditional on its extrinsic features. It must therefore be distinguished from the
value a thing has intrinsically. Further, they claim that once these concepts are separated, it is
final value—not intrinsic value—that is critical to axiology.
To divide final and intrinsic goodness, philosophers provide examples of nonintrinsic final goods. Kagan points to Abraham Lincoln’s pen, Rabinowicz and RønnowRasmussen to Lady Diana’s dress, and Korsgaard to a mink coat. I believe these examples
are unconvincing: they are, surprisingly, ruled out by the conditionalist’s own accounts of
final value.

Chapter 4: Ends and Value as an End
I continue my reply to the conditionalist. For the sake of argument, I ignore the
concerns raised in the previous chapter, and instead consider other ways that the Moorean
might defend his position. I settle upon a dilemma. I argue that “final value” is ambiguous; it
may denote the value a thing has as an end or it may denote the value a thing has ultimately
(i.e. non-derivatively). In the first case, we may, in fact, reject the division of final and
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intrinsic value; in the second case, we may claim that intrinsic value is the most important
kind of final value. I argue that under either condition, the Moorean position may be
maintained.

Chapter 5: Reasons and Goodness: Moore, Brentano, and Scanlon
Having defended the Moorean view to the best of my ability, I turn to explication.
One immediate question concerns the relation between intrinsic goodness and other
normative notions. Many contemporary philosophers believe that goodness is analyzable in
terms of reasons: they say that for a thing to be valuable is for there to be reasons to value it.
I agree that value is connected with reasons but reject such reductive accounts.
Unsurprisingly, I side instead with Moore; I say that intrinsic goodness is a conceptual
primitive. I thus dedicate myself to the influential arguments marshaled against Moore’s
claims, including those advanced by Scanlon, Jacobson, and Hooker and Stratton-Lake; I
argue that they do not succeed.

Chapter 6: A Moorean Account of Intrinsic Value
Though I believe that none of the objections presented so far give us reason to
abandon the Moorean program in axiology, I think it worth considering how to make
Moore’s view as plausible as we can. I am particularly eager to accommodate the kind of
internal objections raised by those friendly to the Moorean project. I thus present the
original versions of Moore’s supervenience, necessity, isolation, and obligation principles and
then suggest revisions. I close by arguing (as I assume in the previous chapter) that the
Moorean should also connect intrinsic value with our reasons for action. This may help us
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defend the claims of Zimmerman and others that intrinsic goodness is a kind of ethical
goodness.

Chapter 7: Two Kinds of Value Pluralism
I complete my explication of the Moorean conception of axiology by presenting
some of its fundamental puzzles. I turn to the bearers of intrinsic value; I ask about the truth
of value pluralism. But though this question has been discussed extensively, I fear it is not
well understood. I argue that there are two distinct views that we call ‘value pluralism,’ but
that these views have not been properly stated or distinguished. I separate and
elucidate these two kinds of pluralism; I show that a number of contemporary arguments in
favor of value pluralism rely upon a kind confusion between these two views.

4

CHAPTER II
SIMPLY GOOD: A DEFENSE OF THE PRINCIPIA
G.E. Moore’s Principia Ethica is an ambitious work. Moore hopes to understand
normative ethics through axiology; he identifies one fundamental value concept—intrinsic
goodness—and provides accounts of rightness of action and excellence of character in terms
of it.1 Moore’s view is well known: he says we act rightly when we make the world as good as
we can, and that we are virtuous when we are disposed to perform right actions. There is,
then, a structure to normative ethics: axiology first, deontology second, and virtue theory
third.
As even its most ardent opponents admit, there is something attractive about
Moore’s project.2 But its popularity is fading. Most critics attempt to halt the project after it
gets started: they accept Moore’s conception of goodness, but reject the significance he gives
it.3 However, increasingly, philosophers hope to stop the project at its beginning. In her
influential (1997) and elsewhere, Judith Jarvis Thomson claims that Moore’s account goes
wrong because “there is no such thing as goodness.” Her arguments build upon Geach’s
work: she says that facts about the adjective ‘good’ give us reason to reject the concept at the
heart of Moore’s system.
I am a Moorean—I think there is still promise in the project of the Principia. I hope
to defend my position; I want to show that, despite its popularity, Thomson’s objection does
not undermine the Moorean program. This is because Thomson’s target is not Moore’s
See Moore (1993: 192, 196-197, 219-220).
In her (1985), Foot says: “It is remarkable how [Moorean] utilitarianism tends to haunt even those of us who
will not believe in it. It is as if we for ever feel that it must be right, although we insist that it is wrong.” In her
(1997) Thomson also says that she finds Moore’s project powerful and attractive—shortly before arguing that it
is incoherent.
3 Most attention has been paid to Moore’s ideal utilitarian account of right action and its allegedly unacceptable
consequences. For discussion of perhaps the most powerful objections to the theory and an attractive Moorean
reply, see Feldman (1995).
1
2
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intrinsic goodness but rather generic goodness. And this concept is not needed, I believe, to
construct Moore’s system.
Still, Moore’s critics are unlikely to accept defeat. Some note that most accounts of
intrinsic goodness seem to appeal to a generic notion of goodness—including Moore’s own
account. And if this is true, then some version of Thomson’s argument may make contact
with the Moorean project after all. Others claim that though Moore does not require the
concept of generic goodness, he does require the similar concept of absolute goodness or
goodness simpliciter. And this notion, they claim, is just as objectionable.
I hope to defuse these concerns. I first show how we may dispense with generic
goodness without losing intrinsic goodness. And while I accept that Moorean intrinsic
goodness is a kind of absolute goodness, I argue that the objections marshaled against the
concept are unsound.

§1: Thomson’s Attack
Thomson claims that Moore’s system is built upon a naïve concept of goodness. She
writes:
Moore’s story begins with the good. Some things are good, Moore said, and some
things are not good; so there is such a property as goodness—all good things have it
and all things that are not good lack it …The second part of the story flows from the
first: there being such a property as goodness, there is also such a relation as being
better than, or betterness… Moore’s story then concludes: the right is analyzable in
terms of the relation betterness. Thus for it to be the case that Alfred ought to do a
thing at a time is for it to be the case that the world will be better if he does the thing
than it will be if he does any of the other things it is open to him to do at the time.
(1997: 274).
Since the kind of goodness Thomson speaks of is undifferentiated or generic, let us call it
generic goodness. She characterizes this notion by appealing to three principles, each of which
she claims Moore endorsed. First, as Thomson says above, generic goodness is the property
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all good things have in common.4 Thus any good thing, whether it be a good act, a good
dryer, or a good lesson, is generically good. Second, generic goodness is the property we
attribute to a thing when we say ‘that’s good,’ without a qualifier like ‘to eat’ or ‘as an
example’—it is the property of being “just plain good.”5
Third and finally, on Thomson’s interpretation, Moore is a kind of axiological
monist: he denies that there are many kinds of goodness. Rather, everything that is good in
any respect is good because it possesses this property of generic goodness. Thomson writes:
[According to Moore] for a thing to be a good person is for it to possess the
properties being good and being a person, for a thing to be a good tennis player is
for it to possess the properties being good and being a tennis player, and for a thing
to be a good toaster is for it to possess the properties being good and being a toaster.
More generally, for a thing to be good in a respect is for it to possess the properties
being good and being the relevant kind. (2008: 3)6
But, Thomson says, there is an immediate problem: there is no such thing as generic
goodness; the concept is, she claims, unintelligible. Thus Moore’s project is “incoherent
from the outset.”7
I do not want to examine Thomson’s case against generic goodness now. For the
sake of argument, I am willing to simply agree—I admit that there is no such thing as generic
goodness; nothing that all and only good things have in common. But I want to show that,
even given this, Thomson’s argument against the Moorean position does not succeed.

This is stated also in her (1994: 8), (2003a: 17) and (2008: 2).
She writes in her (2003a: 17): “[Goodness] is the property that we would be ascribing to a thing—whether an
event or anything else—if we said of it ‘That’s good’; and that is the property such that we are asking whether a
thing possesses it when we ask about the thing ‘Is it good?’” See also her (2003b: 72) and (2008: 7).
6 This is suggested also in her (1994: 8). It is worth noting that Thomson takes the principle to have broader
application than may be apparent here; she assumes that, for Moore, whenever a thing is good in any respect—
whether it is a good as a toaster, or good at heating the room, or good for your diet—this is because it possesses
the property of generic goodness. See her (2008: 3-6).
7 See also Thomson (1994: 8), (1997: 275), (2003b: 72), and (2008: 3-7).
4
5
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§2: A Distinction: Intrinsic Value and Generic Value
Generic goodness is a strange property. Thomson’s third principle guarantees that it
attaches to anything that is good in any respect. It therefore necessarily attaches to everything
that exists. Assume for reductio that there is something that fails to be good in any respect.
Then this thing would be a good counterexample to the thesis that everything is generically
good. It would thus be good in some respect, and would therefore be generically good. 8 For
similar reasons, everything is generically bad.
However, if this is so, then it is unclear how generic goodness could be maximized—
and thus unclear how the concept could possibly do what Moore hoped. If, as Thomson
claims, this was the notion Moore was concerned with, then he has made a profound
mistake.
But does Moore’s system truly depend upon the concept of generic goodness?
Thomson’s interpretation is grounded in just one passage, which she cites each time she
discusses Moore’s program:9
Ethics is undoubtedly concerned with the question what good conduct is; but, being
concerned with this, it obviously does not start at the beginning, unless it is prepared
to tell us what is good as well as what is conduct. For ‘good conduct’ is a complex
notion: all conduct is not good; for some is certainly bad and some may be
indifferent. And on the other hand, other things, beside conduct, may be good; and
if they are so, then, ‘good’ denotes some property, that is common to them and to
conduct… (1993: 54)
I agree with Thomson: this passage does suggest that Moore was interested in some generic
kind of goodness. But granting this does not justify Thomson’s interpretation of the
Moorean project. She needs to show that generic goodness is the notion of importance for
Moore; that it is the concept the Principia is dedicated to understanding; that it is the concept

I suspect Thomson would accept this argument: she reasons similarly in her (2008: 10).
See her (1994: 8), (1997: 273), and (2008: 2). She paraphrases this same passage in her (2003a) and (2003b) but
does not provide a citation.
8
9
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he invokes in his accounts of right action and virtuous character. But she does not provide
evidence for these claims. And they are, I believe, mistaken.
Consider the second preface to the Principia. Moore writes:
[I]t cannot be too emphatically insisted that the predicate which…I call ‘good,’ and
which I declare to be indefinable, is only one of the predicates for which the word
‘good’ is commonly used to stand... (1993: 3)
He then declares:
[T]he predicate I am concerned with is that sense of the word ‘good’ which has to the
conceptions of ‘right’ and ‘wrong,’ a relation, which makes it the sense which is of the
most fundamental importance for Ethics. Let us call that predicate G. (1993: 5)
Finally, Moore states what he thinks is most important about G:
It now only remains to try to say, as clearly as I can, what it is that I am really anxious
to say about G…G is a property which depends only on the intrinsic nature of the things which
possess it. (1993: 21-22)
This, I believe, makes it clear that Moore was sensitive to the fact that there are many kinds
of goodness; he was not a monist in the way Thomson suggests. Rather, he wanted to pick
out a particular kind of goodness, a kind of goodness he was eager to characterize. And this
is the kind of goodness that depends only on the intrinsic properties of a thing—intrinsic
goodness. When he uses ‘good’ without a qualifier it is this kind of value—not generic
value—that he hopes to express.10
Indeed, Moore repeatedly makes plain that it is intrinsic goodness that is
fundamental to his moral program. In the first chapter of the Principia, Moore states what he
takes to be the dual concerns of ethics: first, the nature and bearers of instrumental value, or
value as a means, and second, the nature and bearers of intrinsic value, or value as an end.
He writes, boldly:
See also Moore (1993: 68): “Every one does in fact understand the question ‘Is this good?’…It has a distinct
meaning for him, even though he may not recognise in what respect it is distinct. Whenever he thinks of
‘intrinsic value,’ or ‘intrinsic worth,’ or says that a thing ‘ought to exist,’ he has before his mind the unique
object—the unique property of things—which I mean by ‘good.’”
10
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The primary and peculiar business of Ethics, the determination what things have
intrinsic value and in what degrees, has received no adequate treatment at all.
(1993:78)
This is, of course, too bold. But we are concerned only with the subject of Moorean moral
philosophy. And as this and other passages make clear, the subject of Moorean moral
philosophy is intrinsic goodness. 11 This is why Moore speaks so often, and so carefully,
about the nature of intrinsic value; this is why he tries to understand the relations between
the intrinsic value of a whole and the intrinsic values of its parts; this is why he spends
chapter after chapter examining—and dismissing—views about what things are intrinsically
good.
Further, pace Thomson, I do not believe that Moore invokes the notion of generic
goodness in his account of right action. 12 Rather, his account appeals only to the notion of
intrinsic goodness. 13 “An action is right,” he says, “only if no action, which the agent could
have done instead, would have had intrinsically better results: while an action is wrong, only
if the agent could have done some other action instead whose total results would have been
intrinsically better.”14
Of course, those attracted to Thomson’s position may reply that Moore equated
intrinsic and generic value. But there is no textual evidence to support this claim. And there
is significant evidence against it. Recall that something is generically good if it is good in any
See Zimmerman (2001: 18-19) for a brief argument to the same effect.
Of course if we understand generic goodness differently from Thomson, it may be plausible to think that,
according to Moore, we should maximize the generic goodness of the world. Suppose that generic goodness is
relative to kinds. That is, suppose that something is generically good just in case it is a good member of its kind—
good relative to the standards appropriate to that kind. We might then say that a world is generically good just
in case it is good as a world—that is, good according to the standards appropriate to worlds. And we might
imagine that Moore believed a world is good according to these standards just in case it is intrinsically good.
Under this understanding it would, I think, be plausible to claim that Moore believed we should maximize the
generic value of the world. But of course, this is not Thomson’s conception of generic goodness: she insists
that generic goodness is just plain goodness; it is not relative to kinds. In fact, that is much of the reason she finds
generic value so objectionable.
13 This is, I believe, the orthodox interpretation. See e.g. Feldman (1986: 3), Driver (2014), Shafer-Landau
(2010: 117-121), Shaw (2005: xvi-xvii) and Zimmerman (2008: 2-3), among many others.
14 See his (2005: 30).
11
12
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way. But consider one of the other types of value Moore speaks of: extrinsic goodness, the
kind of goodness something has in virtue of its extrinsic properties. When things are good in
this way, they are, a fortiori, good in some way. So extrinsic goods are generically good. But
we cannot, on pain of contradiction, maintain that this is because of their intrinsic features.
Thus, to claim that Moore conflated intrinsic and generic value would be to accuse of him of
contradicting himself. Without textual evidence, we should, I believe, avoid such accusations.
I therefore reject Thomson’s argument. I think that the fundamental notion of
Moorean moral philosophy is intrinsic goodness, not generic goodness. And I think that
Moore did not conflate these notions.

§3: Intrinsic Goodness without Generic Goodness
I suspect Thomson is aware of this objection. But she does not address it until her
(2008) and restricts her response to a footnote:
I am sure that some readers will say that there is another, and better, alternative at
the bottom of the barrel, namely that the property [Moore] takes “good” to stand for
is…intrinsic goodness. We might well suppose [this kind of goodness] to be
nonderivative goodness… This does seem to be what Moore had in mind when he used the
term in Principia. So understood, however there is no such property as intrinsic
goodness if there is no such property as [generic] goodness. (2008: 16).15
This is a surprising admission: Thomson has argued in her (1994), (1997), (2003a), (2003b),
and in her (2008)16—up to this point—that Moore’s project fails because his fundamental
notion, generic goodness, is illegitimate. But if the Moorean project does not make use of
this notion, as Thomson seems to suggest, then it is unclear how her objection may succeed.
However, Thomson clearly believes that there is some tie between intrinsic goodness
and generic goodness—without the latter, the former cannot exist. But we are not given an
Emphasis mine.
Admittedly, Thomson does provide a very brief discussion of this objection in an appendix to her (2003b).
However it is unclear that she accepts the concern, as she does here.
15
16
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argument for this claim. Still, we might be able to fill in this lacuna. Consider Thomson’s
suggestion:
Non-Derivation: Something is intrinsically good just in case its goodness is nonderivative.
What kind of goodness is being invoked on the right hand side of this biconditional? No
qualifier appears. It cannot be intrinsic goodness: this would render the principle circular.
Nor can it be instrumental goodness, or goodness as a means: such value is always
derivative. So, we might think, this mysterious kind of goodness must be generic goodness.
What else could it be?
This problem may appear unique to Thomson’s non-derivation account. But it is
not: Nearly all accounts of intrinsic goodness seem to invoke some unexplained kind of
goodness. In the Ethics we read:
By saying that a thing is intrinsically good it means that it would be a good thing that
the thing in question should exist, even if it existed quite alone. (2005: 32)
Let us understand this principle as a biconditional. Then we will say:
Isolation: Something is intrinsically good just in case it would still be good, even if it
were the only thing that existed.
The kind of goodness on the right hand side of this biconditional is not specified. But it is
not qualified in any way, either. So, even friends of Moore admit that it may be generic
goodness.17
But if this is true of Moore’s isolation principle, then it is likely true of the rest of the
Moorean principles about intrinsic value, all of which invoke this unexplained concept of
goodness. So it seems that Thomson’s strategy may succeed: by attacking generic goodness,
she has attacked intrinsic goodness too.
17

See Zimmerman (2001: 19).
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However, I believe that we should not understand Moore’s principles in terms of
generic goodness; such interpretations render the principles absurd. Begin with Moore’s
isolation principle. If we understand it in terms of generic goodness, we will say:
Generic Isolation: Something is intrinsically good just in case it would still be generically
good, even if it were the only thing that existed.
But this principle is indefensible.18 Everything is such that, if it were the only thing that
existed, then it would be generically good. This is because generic goodness is the property
that all things that are good in any way have in common. Thus to be generically good, a thing
must simply be good in some way or another. So imagine anything, and then imagine it existing
all alone. Such a thing would then be a good example of a thing that exists all alone. It would
therefore be good in some way, and thus generically good. So this thing, whatever it is, will
be intrinsically good.
Similar problems will infect Moore’s other principles. Consider the necessity
principle: it says that something is intrinsically good just in case it is necessarily good. 19 If we
formulate this claim in terms of generic goodness, we obtain:
Generic Necessity: Something is intrinsically good just in case it is necessarily generically
good.
But, as I have argued, a thing cannot fail to be generically good, since a thing cannot fail to
be good in some way.
We should not accept an interpretation of the Moorean principles that makes them
absurd. So we should not understand these principles in terms of Thomson’s notion of

In his illuminating (1998), Feldman makes a similar point with regard to an understanding of these principles
that appeals to overall value. And, indeed, my solution here mirrors Feldman’s.
19 This principle is perhaps most clearly stated in Moore’s (1922: 260-261).
18

13

generic goodness. Rather, we can endorse a different version of the Moorean claims; we use
the principles to differentiate between kinds of goodness. We say:
Intrinsic Isolation: If something is intrinsically good, then it would continue to be
intrinsically good, even if it were the only thing that existed. But this is not true of
other kinds of goodness.
And:
Intrinsic Necessity: If something is intrinsically good, then it is necessarily intrinsically
good. But this is not true of other kinds of goodness.20
These principles are defensible and attractive; they show us how intrinsic goodness differs
from other sorts of goodness. And they make no appeal to Thomson’s notion of generic
value.21 22 Given this, the Moorean may employ the principles of the Principia without
appealing to the notion of generic goodness—and may, therefore, avoid this second version
of Thomson’s objection.

§4: A New Challenge: Absolute Goodness and the Moorean System
Thomson’s challenge appeals to a particular interpretation of the Principia. I have
claimed that we should reject this interpretation—generic goodness is not the fundamental
notion of Moorean moral philosophy, nor is it required to understand Moore’s primary
concept, intrinsic goodness. And yet many have been attracted to Thomson’s conclusions;

Feldman provides similar modifications for Moore’s supervenience principle in his (1998).
In saying these principles are defensible, I do not mean that they are true in this form. But I believe that they
are close to the truth and provide an excellent place to begin formulating a powerful Moorean view about the
concept of intrinsic goodness.
22 It is important to note that these principles are not supposed to be definitions: for the Moorean, intrinsic value
is a conceptual primitive. Rather, they are only supposed to help us grasp the primitive Moore employs, and to
show how it differs from other concepts. I explain this further in §4.
20
21
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they believe there is something deeply wrong with Moore’s system.23 What grounds their
conviction?
I believe their worry is not truly about generic goodness, as Thomson has described
it. Rather, I think their concern is about a similar concept: the notion of absolute goodness or
goodness simpliciter.
The concept is understood negatively. Many goods are valuable in relation to some
particular, or universal: they are good for a particular person or purpose, or good as a
member of a kind. We attribute relational value to a thing when we say, for example, that it
is good for Jones, or good for cutting the lawn, or a good as an umbrella. But the value of some
goods is not relative to a person, purpose, or kind. Such things are valuable absolutely; they are
good simpliciter. Aristotle said such goods are valuable “without qualification”24, Ross that
they are good “sans phrase;”25 Sidgwick that they are valuable “from the point of view of the
universe.”26
The concepts of absolute and generic value are similar. Indeed, Arneson (2010),
Klocksiem (2011), and Rowland (2016) (among many others) simply identify Thomson’s
notion with the concept of absolute value. But this is a mistake. Generic goodness is
supposed to be (i) the property all good things have in common; (ii) the property of being
“just plain good”, and (iii) the property that makes a thing good in any respect. The tension
between these three principles renders the concept incoherent: because everything is good in
some respect, everything is both generically good and generically bad—and thus everything
is “just plain good” and “just plain bad.” But this is absurd.
Kraut (2011) and Foot (1985), (2001) are perhaps most prominent. But see also Nussbaum (2003),
Brännmark (2009), and Freiman (2014), among many others.
24 See Aristotle (2002: 137, 1152b).
25 See Ross (2002: 102).
26 See Sidgwick (1981: 382). We might claim that, though these philosophers all use similar language, they are
not targeting the same property; see Kraut (2011: 10-11, 209-212) for discussion. This is perhaps true—but
even if these philosophers have subtly distinct concepts in mind, these differences will not be relevant here.
23
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Absolute goodness is what remains of the concept of generic goodness if we remove
this incoherence. It answers only to Thomson’s second principle: to be good absolutely is to
be (simply) good. But the other claims do not hold: goodness simpliciter is not the property all
things that are in any way good have in common—to be a good prison is not to be good
without qualification. And thus a fortiori a good prison cannot be good because it is good
absolutely. So the third principle fails as well.
Once we separate these two notions, we gain access to a third version of Thomson’s
challenge. We join Foot (1985) and Kraut (2011); we claim that Moore’s system cannot be
generated without the notion of absolute goodness. But we insist that the notion be rejected;
we say that nothing is (simply) good—a thing can only be good relationally.
This challenge should be taken seriously. I believe it grounds many philosophers’
suspicion of the Moorean project. And it is more plausible than the objections we have
considered so far. While we can eliminate the connection between generic and intrinsic
value, we cannot eliminate the connection between absolute and intrinsic value. This is
because Moorean intrinsic goodness is a kind of absolute value—to say that something is
intrinsically good in Moore’s sense is not to say that it is good in relation to a particular kind,
or that it is good for someone or something.27 Moore seems to recognize this: in his
arguments against the egoist, he notes that many believe that things can be intrinsically good
Indeed, some claim further that absolute goodness simply is intrinsic goodness. In his important (2012: 14),
Kraut reasons that a thing can be good absolutely only if it is good non-relationally—that is, good in virtue of
its non-relational properties. But a thing is good in virtue of its non-relational properties just in case it is good
intrinsically. Thus intrinsic and absolute goodness are identical. I reject this argument; I think it relies on a kind
of equivocation. To say that a thing is good non-relationally may mean (i) that it is good, but is not merely a
good member of a kind, or good for a particular person or purpose—i.e. that it is good, but is not merely good
for a K or (ii) that it is good in virtue of its non-relational (i.e. intrinsic) properties. These interpretations may
come apart—to say that something is instrumentally good is not to say that it is good relative to some person
or purpose, but instrumental goods do not have their value in virtue of their intrinsic features. Thus I think
Kraut’s argument unsound. However little will hang on this. Regardless of whether intrinsic goodness is
absolute goodness as Kraut and others such as Arneson (2010) maintain, or is simply a kind of absolute
goodness, as I believe, it is still true that, if there is reason to reject the concept of absolute goodness, then
there is reason to reject the concept of intrinsic goodness.
27
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for a person. But this is impossible, he claims: if a thing is intrinsically good in his sense, then it
cannot be good relative to a person; it must be good “universally” or “absolutely.”28
What, however, might be wrong with the notion of absolute value? Many refer to
Thomson’s own argument—and to Geach’s (1956), which inspires it.29 However, as I have
stressed, Thomson’s concern is generic goodness. But this should not worry us now—for, as
we shall see, Thomson’s argument applies easily to absolute goodness as well. (And indeed,
in her most recent work, Thomson turns her previous arguments against the concept of
goodness simpliciter.30) Further, Geach attacks absolute goodness directly in his (1956). So
both may, I think, be understood as challenging the concept of goodness simpliciter. And,
given the influence of their arguments, their claims are worth examining carefully.
Both philosophers proceed linguistically. We first note that there is a distinction
between logically predicative and logically attributive adjective types. Geach writes:
I shall say that in a phrase ‘an A B’ (‘A’ being an adjective and ‘B’ being a noun) ‘A’ is
a (logically) predicative adjective if the predication ‘is an A B’ splits up logically into a
pair of predications ‘is a B’ and ‘is A’; otherwise I shall say that ‘A’ is a (logically)
attributive adjective. (1956: 33)

Of course we might try to deny that intrinsic goodness is a kind of absolute goodness; we might say that to
be intrinsically good is simply to be good relative to the kind state of affairs. (While Moore never made such
claims we may think them consistent with his views—after all, in saying that intrinsic value is a kind of absolute
value, he seems to mean only that it not the kind of value that can be relative to persons.) Thomson anticipates
this reply; she responds that if something is a good member of its kind, this must be because the relevant kind
somehow determines, or grounds, a set of standards. It is clear how this might happen with e.g. umbrellas. But,
as Thomson (2008: 25-26) says, it is not at all clear how this might happen with states of affairs. Yet Thomson’s
reply seems unpersuasive: a particular rainbow may be a good one, but it’s not clear how the class rainbow in any
way grounds, or determines this standard (I am thankful to Fred Feldman for making this concern clear to me).
Still, I am hesitant to claim that to be intrinsically good is to be good relative to the kind states of affairs. Consider
Moorean instrumental value: this is also a feature only of states of affairs, but (since intrinsic and instrumental
value are obviously distinct) we cannot claim also that to be instrumentally good is to be good relative to the
kind state of affairs. But perhaps this difficulty may be overcome. If so, this is simply another way in which we
may resist the critics of the Moorean program.
29 There are, of course, other concerns about the notion of absolute goodness—for summary and discussion,
see Klocksiem (2011b) and Rowland (2016). However, the Thomson/Geach objection is, I believe, the most
powerful and influential; it will therefore be my primary concern in what follows.
30 See her (2008: 14-15).
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Thus an adjective is logically predicative if its attributions can be split; it is logically
attributive if they cannot. So ‘red’, Geach says, is logically predicative: ‘this is a red book’
splits into ‘this is a book’ and ‘this is red.’ But ‘big’ is logically attributive: ‘this is a big flea’
does not mean ‘this is a flea’ and ‘this is big.’31 This shows, Geach says, that there is no
property of being just plain big. Similarly with ‘heavy’, ‘fast’, and ‘strong,’ as well as many
other adjectives.
We next argue that ‘good’ is a logically attributive adjective. Geach asks us to
consider sentences like ‘this is a good car’: this cannot be split, he says, into ‘this is a car’ and
‘this is good.’32 Thomson gives different examples; she asks us to consider sentences like ‘he
is a good tennis player,’ ‘she is a good chess player,’ and ‘it is a good toaster.’33 In each case,
she claims, these sentences cannot be divided. And we can provide more forceful examples:
consider ‘he is a good criminal’ or ‘it is a good prison.’
We conclude that nothing is (simply) good; that, as Geach says, “even when
‘good’…stands by itself as a predicate, and is thus grammatically predicative, some substantive
has to be understood; there is no such thing as being just good or bad, there is only being a
good or bad so-and-so. (1956: 34).”34
But, though the major premise and conclusion are clear, the inference is not: how
does the proposition that ‘good’ is logically attributive entail the proposition that there is no
such thing as goodness simpliciter? Perhaps the idea is this: if there is such a property as
absolute goodness, then it must be expressible in English. And if absolute goodness is
In fact, there is a worry, even here. Consider ‘big.’ Geach claims that it is logically attributive because ‘this is a
big flea’ does not entail ‘this is big.’ But if ‘big’ expresses the same property in ‘this is a big flea’ and ‘this is big,’
then it seems the entailment holds. Alternatively, if ‘big’ means something different in each occurrence, then
entailment fails only because of equivocation. The same seems true of the other examples given—including
‘good.’ However, for the sake of argument, I will ignore these concerns.
32 See Geach (1956: 33-34).
33 See her (2008: 4-6).
34 Emphasis mine. Thomson claims that this is slightly too strong; see her (1997: 277-278). However, the
difference between the conclusion Thomson prefers and what Geach suggests here will not be relevant.
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expressible in English, then it must be expressed by sentences like ‘S is good.’ In such
sentences ‘good’ stands alone and is thus grammatically predicative. But, as Geach notes
above, when a logically attributive adjective is used predicatively, it must be understood as a
disguised attributive. Thus sentences like ‘S is good’ are incomplete; to fill them in, “some
substantive has to be understood.” We conclude that ‘good’ cannot be used to express the
property of being (simply) good; it can only express the property of being good in relation to
something else.
Though I accept much of this argument, I believe it fails at a critical juncture. Let us
say that a grammatically predicative use of an adjective is genuinely predicative when it is not
simply a disguised attributive construction. Geach assumes that if an adjective type is
logically attributive, then it cannot be employed in a way that is genuinely predicative; its
predicative uses must be understood attributively.35 But nothing in the argument given
guarantees this. To say that an adjective is logically attributive is to claim only that some of its
attributions cannot be split. 36 But this does not entail that no attributions of that adjective
can be split, nor does it require that every grammatically predicative use of the adjective be
understood as a disguised attributive.

Though Geach provides no support for this assumption, a standard rationale is available. The argument is
analogical: it first claims that when an adjective is logically predicative (like ‘red’), the truth conditions of its
grammatically attributive uses (like ‘A is a red car’) should be understood in predicative terms; thus ‘A is a red car’
is true just in case A is red and A is a car. Similarly, if some adjective is logically attributive, then the truth
conditions for its grammatically predicative uses should be understood attributively. Thus ‘B is good’ is true just
in case B is good relative to the referent of the contextually supplied substantive. (I am thankful to Bradford
Skow for making this clear to me.) However, ultimately, I think this rationale should be rejected. Consider ‘red’:
some things are simply red, as Thomson and Geach claim. Others are not (simply) red, but are red-for-hair,
red-for-a-face, red-for-an-apple and so on (see Zimmerman (2001: 22)). If we accept the rationale given, we
must conclude that ‘red’ cannot be used both predicatively and attributively; it thus cannot express both the
property of being (simply) red and the properties of being red-for-hair, and so on. If we agree with Thomson
and Geach also that a property exists only if it can be expressed, then we must say that either there is no such
thing as being (simply) red or no such thing as being red-for-hair, etc. Neither is plausible. The concern is, of
course, general: Thomson’s argument about ‘famous’ below shows much the same problem.
36 Note that if we say instead that ‘good’ is logically attributive only if every sentence of the form ‘X is a good K’
does not entail that ‘X is good’ and ‘X is a K,’ then simply providing a few examples where entailment fails, as
Geach and Thomson do, would be insufficient to establish the premise.
35
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Further, Geach’s assumption is independently implausible—as Thomson admits in
her most recent work.37 Consider ‘famous,’ she asks. To say that someone is a famous
philosopher is not to say that they are famous, and a philosopher. Thus ‘famous’ is logically
attributive; some of its attributions cannot be split. But not every grammatically predicative
use of ‘famous’ must be understood as a disguised attributive. After all, some people, like
President Obama, are famous simpliciter: to say that Obama is famous is not to say that he is
famous relative to some kind; he is (simply) famous. Thus, though it is logically attributive,
‘famous’ can be used in a way that is genuinely predicative; when so employed, it expresses
the property of being (simply) famous.
If this is correct, then we may claim the battle won. We join Ross (2002: 65); we
claim that ‘good’ is like ‘famous’: it has both genuinely predicative and genuinely attributive
uses.38 Geach’s argument fails.
But though Thomson accepts that some logically attributive adjectives may have
genuinely predicative uses, she urges us to resist the analogy between ‘good’ and ‘famous:’
What assures us that “famous” does have this second [i.e. genuinely predicative] use
is that we know what the property of being (simply) famous is—it is the property of
being (simply) well known. (2008: 14)
But, she claims, we do not know what the property of being (simply) good is. She examines
three options: goodness simpliciter might be (i) the property of being “prima facie ought
making”; (ii) the property of being “good in some respect or other” or (iii) “our old friend,
the property [generic] goodness.”39 She rejects all three—correctly, I believe—and concludes
that there is no such thing as being (simply) good.

See her (2008: 14).
See his (2003: 65).
39 See her (2008: 15-17).
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I think, however, that we should not be persuaded by Thomson’s reply. Her defense
abandons the argument given: Geach and Thomson (up to this point) have told us that there
is no such thing as absolute goodness because ‘good’ cannot be used in a way that is
genuinely predicative. Thomson now tells us that ‘good’ cannot be used in a way that is
genuinely predicative, because there is no such property as absolute goodness. We cannot
accept both possibilities.
Further, I believe we have already answered Thomson’s charge—to be absolutely
good is simply to possess non-relational value. If there are many kinds of non-relational
value, as I believe, then we may think of absolute goodness as a general concept that
particular notions like intrinsic goodness and instrumental goodness fall under.
Thomson may object; she may demand that we define the species of value that fall
under the concept we have described—or, at least, that we define the fundamental concept
that falls under it, intrinsic goodness (as she does in her (2003b: 79) and (2008: 16)). But this
demand is unacceptable: Moorean intrinsic goodness is a primitive.40 Thus to insist it be
defined is simply to reject Moore’s project at the outset.
Of course some may claim that they cannot grasp Moore’s concept. But for those of
us who do not already agree with Thomson, this objection is likely to ring hollow. We use
the concept frequently: we ask about the intrinsic values of our lives; about the intrinsic
values of our actions; about the intrinsic value of the world.41 We think that certain events—

Moore makes this plain repeatedly; he writes in his (1993: 58): “If I am asked ‘What is good?’ my answer is
that good is good, and that is the end of the matter. Or if I am asked ‘How is good to be defined?’ my answer is
that it cannot be defined, and that is all I have to say about it.” See also his (1993: 61, 69, 72, 89, 111).
41 Of course, we do not use the term ‘intrinsic value’ much outside of axiology. Moore’s critics may thus
respond that it is a technical term with no pre-theoretical application. But the fact that we do not use the word
‘intrinsic value’ does not mean that we do not employ the concept. When we ask e.g. whether the world is a
good place, we are not wondering whether the world is good for some purpose, or good for ourselves. Rather,
I think we are wondering whether it is good in itself. And we may ask similar questions about our lives, and our
actions. Thus we do, I think, make use of the concept of intrinsic value outside of philosophy—even if we do
not employ the term.
40
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like the suffering brought on by natural disasters—are bad in themselves and that others—
like innocent pleasures—are good. Such claims are hardly unintelligible.
Further, not only is Moore’s primitive familiar, but he has taken great pains to
describe it. Schaffer writes:
Everyone needs their primitives. Anytime one introduces a primitive one has to say
what work it does. This means introducing axioms. These axioms characterize the
inferential connection between the primitive and nearby notions. Some axioms
characterize internal connections between the primitive and itself, such as when one
stipulates that a proposed primitive binary relation is transitive. And some axioms
characterize external connections to surrounding concepts (without these the proposed
primitive would be an idle wheel). This much should be uncontroversial.42
Moore does as he is asked: he states a number of principles that govern the nature of
intrinsic value—he explains that it supervenes upon intrinsic non-moral features, that it
persists in isolation, and that it attaches necessarily to its bearers. He also shows how
intrinsic goodness is related to other moral concepts—and (in giving his supervenience
claim) how it is related to non-moral concepts as well. He thus satisfies the basic constraints
on introducing a primitive.
As Schaffer suggests, we should accept—or reject—Moore’s primitive based on the
work it can do. This, in turn, involves an evaluation of the overall Moorean program.
Thomson’s strategy is therefore backwards: we should not reject Moore’s system because we
are skeptical of the notion of intrinsic value. Rather, we should be skeptical of the notion of
intrinsic value only if we have reason to reject Moore’s system.43And Thomson has given us
no such reason.

See his (Unpublished: 2).
Note however that this is a necessary—but not sufficient—reason to reject the concept. Even if Moore’s
system fails, the concept of intrinsic value may still be significant. Every great treatise in moral philosophy—
including the works of Plato, Aristotle, and Kant—features discussion of what things are valuable intrinsically,
and the notion of intrinsic value is still widely considered fundamental in axiology. Thus more work would
need to be done to reject Moore’s concept.
42
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I conclude that the Moorean project survives all three versions of Thomson’s
challenge. His moral system may yet fail—but it does not fail in the way Thomson claims.44

Thomson sometimes advances a seemingly independent concern: she claims that it is not possible to answer
questions about what things are intrinsically good (see e.g. her (2003b: 13)). And, admittedly, questions about
what things are intrinsically good are more difficult to answer than questions about what things are good
toasters, or umbrellas. But most questions in philosophy are difficult to answer; this does not make them bad
questions (compare: what is knowledge? Or what are the fundamental ontological categories?).
44
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CHAPTER III
THE PEN, THE DRESS, AND THE COAT: A CONFUSION IN GOODNESS
The final value of a thing is the value it has for its own sake, or as an end. The intrinsic
value of a thing is the value it has in itself or in virtue of its intrinsic features.1 Conditionalists hope to
separate these two kinds of value. They claim that the goodness a thing has as an end may be
conditional on its extrinsic features, such as its historical or societal role. But the intrinsic
goodness of a thing cannot be conditional in this way. So, they conclude, we must separate
intrinsic and final value.
Consequently, axiology must be reformed: we cannot follow Moore (1993) and
identify the intrinsic value of a thing with the value it has as an end. Nor can we accept
Moore’s suggestion that intrinsic value is the fundamental concept of value theory. We care
about what is good as an end, the conditionalist says, not what is good intrinsically.2 Indeed,
intrinsic goods are simply an unremarkable subset of final goods.3 Thus, the conditionalist
concludes, final value should replace intrinsic value as the central concept of axiology.

Philosophers speak of this issue in different ways: Bradley (2002), Dorsey (2012), Hurka (1998), and
Kagan (1998) use “intrinsic value” to refer to the value something has as an end, or for its own sake, and
some other term, like “intrinsic value proper” to refer to the value something has in virtue of its intrinsic
features. Korsgaard (1983), Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000), Fletcher (2009) and Zimmerman
(2001), (2010) use “intrinsic value” to refer to the value a thing has intrinsically, and some other term, like
“final value” to refer to the value a thing has as an end, or for its own sake. I will follow Korsgaard’s
usage in what follows and will translate other authors to speak in this way. This will not alter the
propositions expressed; as these philosophers admit, these are simply different ways of speaking. For
more on terminology see Dorsey (2012), Rønnow-Rasmussen and Zimmerman (2005), and Zimmerman
(2010).
2 Kagan (1998: 290) writes “Why should this type of value [i.e. intrinsic value] be of any more interest to
us as value theorists than it would be to pick out the value that an object has on the basis of its relational
properties alone? Or the value that an object has on the basis of its 17-place properties alone?”
Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen ask “what is so special about value that supervenes on the object’s
internal rather than relational properties…? One can easily see the normative relevance of the notion of a
final value…but the concept of an intrinsic value seems to lack a special normative interest.” (2000: 127)
3 See e.g. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000: 115-116, 127).
1
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Conditionalists motivate the distinction between final and intrinsic value by
providing examples. Kagan’s is, I think, the most powerful and well known. He asks us to
consider the pen Abraham Lincoln used to sign the Emancipation Proclamation:
Clearly, this pen has considerable instrumental value – it was the actual means by
which a great deal of [final] good was brought into the world. But it seems to me that
we might want to say something more than this. It seems to me that we might want
to suggest…that the continued existence of this pen has value as an end. Of course,
the pen’s defining instrumental moment is now long since over. But by virtue of that
history, we might say, it now possesses [final] value: it is something we could
reasonably value for its own sake. The world is richer for the existence of the pen; its
destruction would diminish the value of the world as such. (1998: 285)
The pen’s final value, Kagan says, cannot be explained by appealing to its intrinsic features.
Rather if the pen is good as an end this is because of its relation to Lincoln. 4 So, the intrinsic
and final values of the pen must differ.
Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen also rely on examples. In the most discussed,
they point to Lady Diana’s dress:
Princess Diana’s dress may be another case in point. The dress is valuable just
because it has belonged to Diana. This is what we value it for. But, one might object,
is it really a case of a non-instrumental value? Diana’s dress is perhaps valuable
merely as a means: merely because it allows us to establish an indirect connection to
a person we admire or find important in one way or another. Having such a
connection may be something that we set a final value on. Couldn’t this be what is
going on here? Not necessarily… if we idolize Diana, we do not simply find the
dress useful for some purpose; we ascribe an independent value to it. (2000: 41)
So, while the dress can be reasonably thought to have “non-instrumental” or final value, this
value cannot be explained by pointing to its intrinsic features. Rather the dress is good “just
because it has belonged to Diana.”
Korsgaard provides a different set of cases. Her discussion of the value of a mink
coat is well known:

In general, I will say that a thing has value because of some feature F just in case F explains—in part or in
whole—the value of that thing; we may say that F is a part (proper or otherwise) of what makes that thing
good.
4
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Is [a mink coat] valuable as a means or as an end? One hardly wants to say that it is
valuable only as a means, to keep the cold out. The people who want mink coats are
not willing to exernge them for plastic parkas, if those are better protection against
the elements. A mink coat can be valued the way we value things for their own sakes:
a person might put it on a list of the things he always wanted, or aspires to have
some day, right alongside adventure, travel, or peace of mind. (1983: 185)
People who care about mink coats do not care about them only as a means to an end,
Korsgaard says. And yet the value of a mink coat can only be partially explained by pointing
to its materials, construction, and other intrinsic features:
A coat is essentially instrumental: were it not for the ways in which human beings
respond to cold, we would not care about them or ever think about them. To say that
the coat is intrinsically or unconditionally valuable is absurd: its value is dependent
upon an enormously complicated set of conditions, physiological, economic, and
symbolic. (1983: 185)
These three examples have become familiar: many now merely mention them to
establish the distinction between final and intrinsic value.5 But the conditionalist’s faith in
such cases is, I believe, unjustified. This is because, surprisingly, the pen, the dress, and the
coat cannot have final value. I argue that the problem is internal: these cases are ruled out by
every conditionalist account of final value, including those suggested in Kagan (1998), Hurka
(1998), Olson (2004), and Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000). (Korsgaard does not
provide a substantive account of the concept.)6 Further, the problem with these well-known
cases applies to many other supposed examples of non-intrinsic, final goods. Thus nearly all
cases given to support the conditionalist view cannot succeed.7 I suggest a kind of diagnosis:
I claim that these examples are best seen as instances of sentimental value, rather than final
See e.g. Stecker (2002), Green (1996), Fletcher (2009), Bradford (2013), and Dussault (2014).
Korsgaard does, however, attempt to specify the bearers and source of this kind of value. On the
Kantian theory she advances in her (1983) and (1986), there is one unconditional final good: the good, or
rational, will. All conditional final goods have their value conferred upon them by the good will. Thus, the
good will is the “source” of conditional final value. However, she has since modified her view: she claims
now that nothing has final value unconditionally. See her (1996: 407).
7 There are other ways to support the conditionalist program; see e.g. Dorsey’s (2012). I will not engage
with such arguments here. My aim is to undermine the popular examples that have been given to support
the conditionalist position; arguments like Dorsey’s appeal not to particular cases, but to claims about the
concept of final value.
5
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value. I close by providing a brief account of sentimental value and explain how it relates to
instrumental, intrinsic, and final goodness.

§1: Conditionalist Accounts of Final Value
There are three major conditionalist accounts of final value. The first appeals to
derivation: it says that final value is non-derivative. The second appeals to fitting attitudes: it says
that something has final value if it fitting to hold a pro-attitude towards it for its own sake.
And the third points to contributory value: it says that something has final value if it directly
contributes to the overall value of the world.
I want to show that these accounts are inconsistent with the claims of Kagan,
Korsgaard, and Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen.

§2: The Non-Derivation Account
First let us examine the non-derivation account, as advanced by philosophers such as
Bykvist (2015), Olson (2004), and Zimmerman (2001).8 Imagine we ask why it’s good to be
healthy. One reply is that it’s good to be healthy because being healthy leads to being happy.9
This reply suggests that health has a derivative kind of value: it has value because of the value
of happiness. Now, if we ask why it is good to be happy we may not be able to provide an
interesting answer. Happiness is not good because of something else; its value is nonderivative.

Zimmerman later restricts his view; he claims that only the atoms of final value have non-derivative value.
We should note also that Zimmerman is a Moorean; he defends a non-derivation view as a dialectically
neutral account of final value before arguing that the final and intrinsic values of a thing must always
coincide. However all Mooreans should accept the non-derivation thesis. This is because the Moorean
position entails the non-derivation view: if the final value of a thing depends only on its intrinsic
properties, then the final value of a thing cannot also depend on the value of something else.
9 I borrow this example from Zimmerman. See his (2010).
8
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In general, let us say that a thing has derivative value just in case it has value because
something else has value.10 11 We can then say:12
Non-Derivation: A thing has final value only if its value is not derivative.13
This account is intuitive: it does seem that if a thing has value for its own sake, or as an end,
then its value cannot depend upon the value of something else. In this sense final value is a
kind of ultimate value, which may ground and explain other kinds of value. The nonderivation view is also robust: it gives us the power to distinguish final value from other
kinds of value. This is because other kinds of value, like value as a means, and value as a
sign, are derivative kinds of value—we cannot explain why a thing has those kinds of value
without appealing to the value of something else.
However the non-derivation account entails that our three examples cannot have
final value. Begin with the pen. It has final value because of its instrumental value. Kagan is
explicit:
It seems plausible to suggest that if this pen does indeed have any [final] value, most
or all of it is due to this instrumental role. Stripped of its instrumental history, the
pen probably has no [final] value at all. Thus, in this case, it might be suggested, the
[final] value of an object depends completely upon its instrumental value. (1998: 286)
But instrumental value is a derivative kind of value: a thing has instrumental value because of
the value of what it brings about. And if this is true, then our conclusion looms: the
I use ‘because of’ as indicated in fn. 4.
We may wish to make an exception for complex goods: those things that have final value because of the
values of their parts. We can then say that a thing has non-derivative value just in case it does not have its
value in virtue of the value of anything outside of it—i.e. in virtue of anything that is not a part of it. This
decision will not affect what follows: neither version of the non-derivation account is compatible with the
claim that the pen, the dress, and the coat have final value.
12 Olson adds a clause to the view: he says that final value is a kind of non-derivative, non-contributory kind
of value. I am skeptical that this addition is desirable; its omission will not be relevant here.
13 We might worry that this principle is too strong. Suppose e.g. that some state has value as a means and value
as an end. Since value as a means is derivative, this state has value because something else has value. Thus, we
claim, it cannot have value as an end, according to the non-derivation principle. However, I believe this
objection misunderstands the claim presented. The non-derivation principle says only that final value is nonderivative; it declares that, if a thing has final value, then it cannot have that value (i.e. its final value) because
something else has value.
10
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transitivity of the because of relation will declare that the pen’s allegedly final value is
derivative. To summarize:
(1) If the pen is finally valuable, this is because it is instrumentally valuable.
(2) If the pen is instrumentally valuable, this is because something else has value.
But since the because of relation is transitive, we can infer:14
(3) If the pen is finally valuable, this is because something else has value.
Thus the non-derivation account rules out the possibility that the pen has final value.
The same reasoning eliminates the coat. As we have seen, Korsgaard is clear that the
coat’s final value cannot be explained without appealing to its value in keeping out the cold:
it is “essentially instrumental.” So the coat will have final value because—among other
reasons—it has instrumental value. Thus its allegedly final value is also derivative.
These concerns may seem to apply straightforwardly to the dress as well. But unlike
Kagan and Korsgaard, Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen do not say that the dress is
finally valuable because it is instrumentally valuable. They say instead that the dress is
valuable just because Diana owned it. But this is not plausible: the value of the dress must
depend on the value of Diana’s life and actions.15 Suppose Diana had lived an entirely
different life—imagine that she had been a villain, rather than a princess. This would affect
the value of the dress. But this is inconsistent with the non-derivation account, since a thing
cannot have non-derivative value because of the value of something else.16

This view is held nearly universally: transitivity is both intuitively appealing and theoretically useful. Still,
some have attempted to provide cause to abandon it; see e.g. Schaffer (2014). I will say briefly that I find the
counterexamples advanced against transitivity unpersuasive—but further discussion of such issues is beyond
the scope of this essay.
15 This is not ad hoc: these examples must be plausible. After all, the conditionalist cannot support his view
by claiming that there is some case in which we could, implausibly, claim that a thing has final value because
of its extrinsic features.
16 Some may say that we should be more liberal; we should say that something has non-derivative value
just in case it does not have value only because something else has value. If final value is non-derivative in
only this weaker sense, then our three examples are not excluded: their value depends on the value of
14
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§3: Fitting Attitudes
The non-derivation account entails that the pen, the dress, and the coat cannot have
final value. The conditionalist may reply that this result is unique to this account. But the two
other views that conditionalists endorse have the same consequence, and for much the same
reason.
Consider fitting attitude accounts. These positions are inspired by Brentano’s (2009);
they focus on our responses to goods. According to such views:
Fitting Attitudes: A thing has final value only if it is fitting to care about it for its own
sake.17
After rejecting the Moorean position in his (1998), Hurka endorses this kind of view; he
says that if something is finally good then “it is something we should care about and pursue
for its own sake because of its value.” In their (2000), Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen
concur, writing that “to be valuable, for its own sake, is to be a fitting object of a positive
response (a pro-attitude or a pro-behavior) that is directed to the value bearer for its own
sake.” And Kagan suggests a similar account, in his (1998).
To evaluate such views we must say what it means for a thing to be fitting to care
about “for its own sake.” Let us say that a thing is fitting to care about in this way just in

other things but does not depend entirely upon the value of these things. But this defense cannot succeed,
even if we admit that our three examples do not have value only because of the values of others things.
This is because the proposed weakening of the non-derivation view renders it trivial: nearly every kind of
value is non-derivative in this liberal sense. Instrumental goods, for example, will now have non-derivative
value: the instrumental value of a knife, for example, depends not only on the value of certain outcomes,
but also on the fact that the knife can bring about those outcomes. And what the knife can bring about
depends upon the shape, curve, and other physical properties of the knife, as well as facts about the laws
of nature. The proposed understanding of the non-derivation views therefore renders it toothless; it
should be rejected.
17 I speak in terms of care here, but other philosophers have suggested other pro-attitudes. Some also
speak not of the pro-attitudes that would be fitting but those that would be required, apt, or correct. These
differences will not be relevant here.
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case (i) it’s fitting to care about it and (ii) it’s not fitting to care about it because it is fitting to
care about something else.
But now the same problem arises. Consider Lincoln’s pen. Since we have connected
final value with what it is fitting to care about, we should say that the properties that make a
thing finally good are the properties that make it fitting to care about. Kagan has told us that
the pen has final value because it has instrumental value. So the pen must be fitting to care
about because it has instrumental value.
However, a thing has instrumental value because something else has value. So if it is
fitting to care about the pen because of its instrumental value then it is fitting to care about the
pen because of the value of something else—i.e. because it is fitting to care about something distinct
from the pen. We can argue:
(1) If it is fitting to care about the pen for its own sake, then this is because of its
instrumental value.
(2) If it is fitting to care about the pen because of its instrumental value, then this is
because it is fitting to care about something else.
But the because of relation is transitive. So we can conclude:
(3) If it fitting to care about the pen for its own sake, then this is because it is fitting
to care about something else.
But this is impossible. So the pen cannot be worth caring about for its own sake and thus
cannot have final value, according to fitting attitude views. The same reasoning will eliminate
the coat.
As before, we may need to approach the dress differently. If we should care about
the dress for its own sake, then we should care about the dress in virtue of the features that
its goodness depends upon. According to Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen there is just
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one such feature, having been owned by Diana. But, as I have argued, the value of the dress must
also depend upon the value of Diana’s life and actions. Thus if it is fitting to care about
Diana’s dress for its own sake, this is because it is fitting to care about Diana’s life. But this is
impossible. So the fitting attitude account entails that Diana’s dress cannot have final value
either.18

§4: The Contributory Account
This same problem applies to the last group of views. These accounts connect final
value with contributory value. We can say that, according to such views:
Contribution: A thing is finally good only if it directly contributes to the value of the
world.
In his (1998) Hurka suggests such an account. Kagan endorses something similar in his
(1998). And Bradley attributes this kind of view to the conditionalist in his (2002).
It is important to note that, according to the contributory view, something has final
value only if it directly contributes to the value of the world. If we remove this feature of the
theory, then it cannot succeed. This is because things with instrumental value also contribute
to the value of the world. But their contribution is indirect—they contribute by bringing
about other things.
However, if we wish to make use of the notion of direct contribution, we must explain
it. Bradley’s account is perhaps the most developed. He first explains indirect contribution:
When we consider something that has merely instrumental value, it contributes value to
the world in virtue of bringing something else of value into the world. We can fully
Again, one could object that a thing is fitting to care about for its own sake just in case it is not fitting to
care about only because it is fitting to care about something else (see fn. 16). But, as before, this would
render the view we are considering untenable: things with instrumental value are not fitting to care about
only because of the value of something else but also because they are connected to these other goods in
the right way: it would be absurd to care about a because of the value of b if a and b are unrelated.
18
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explain its value by appealing to the value of the other thing, and telling a story about
how the two things are related. Thus, its contribution to the value of the world is
mediated by the other valuable thing; it is indirect. (2002: 31)19
Of course, a thing directly contributes to the world just in case its contribution is not indirect.
Thus we may say that a thing directly contributes to the world just in case (i) it contributes to
the value of the world and (ii) it does not contribute through some intermediary—that is, it
does not contribute to the world because something else contributes to the world. 20
But if this is correct, then the argument should be obvious. Since we have connected
final value with what directly contributes to the value of the world, we must agree that the
properties that make a thing finally good are the properties that make it contribute to the
value of the world. But our three examples are finally good because of the values of other
things. So they will, similarly, contribute because of other contributions. They will therefore
not contribute directly, and will be ruled out by this account.

§5: A Confusion in Goodness
There are three kinds of conditionalist views about final value. I have argued that
they all entail that the well-known examples given by Kagan, Korsgaard, and Rabinowicz and
Rønnow-Rasmussen cannot have final value. This is true of other examples as well: Kagan
points to a “capable racecar” and culinary skills; Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen to
“Napoleon’s hat” and a gun that was used at the battle of Verdun; Korsgaard to “handsome

Bradley refines his account later, to deal with some possible counterexamples. But these modifications will
not affect our argument.
20 Of course, the conditionalist could appeal to some other account of contribution. Suppose we say that a
thing, x, directly contributes to the value of the world only if (i) x contributes to the value of the world but (ii)
it is not the case that there is something y such that x causes y and y completely accounts for x’s contribution. (I
am thankful to Peter Graham for raising this objection.) The resulting view is permissive; it allows that the pen,
the dress, and the coat may have final value. But this comes at a significant cost. Particular things do not cause
anything; it is only events (or states of affairs) that stand in the causation relation. Condition (ii) of the principle
is therefore satisfied vacuously. Thus according to the revised contribution view, any object that contributes to
the value of the world in any way may have value as an end.
19

33

china” and “gorgeously enameled frying pans.” But the values of these things cannot be
explained without appealing to the values of other things. So they cannot have final value
according to the accounts examined. Similar reasoning will show that most other examples
given in the literature cannot have value as an end.21 Thus, surprisingly, the most common
form of argument in favor of the conditionalist position provides it with no support at all.
Of course the conditionalist could retreat to some other account of final value. But it
is hard to see how such an account could succeed. To accommodate the counterexamples
given, this new account must say that a thing can have value for its own sake, or as an end,
even if (i) its value is derivative (ii) it is not fitting to care about for its own sake and (iii) it
does not contribute directly to the value of the world.
We have reason, then, to believe that the pen, the dress, and the coat cannot have
final value. Where did the conditionalist go wrong? Return to the rationales given.
Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen write that:
Diana’s dress is perhaps valuable merely as a means: merely because it allows us
to establish an indirect connection to a person we admire or find important in one
way or another. Having such a connection may be something that we set a final value
on. Couldn’t this be what is going on here? Not necessarily… if we idolize Diana, we
do not simply find the dress useful for some purpose; we ascribe an independent
value to it. (2000: 41)
This is the standard argument; as we have seen, Korsgaard reasons similarly.22 In such
arguments, the conditionalist assumes that if a thing has value, but does not have value as a
mere means, then it must have value as an end. This is, I think, the beginning of the
problem, for this is not a legitimate inference—the distinction between value as an end and
Still, some examples may escape from this argument. E.g. O’Neil (1992) points to a forest “untouched
by human hands.” It is not clear how we could apply our argument to such a case. And some of Kagan’s
examples may be similarly immune. These cases will therefore have to be handled differently—and
though I am confident that this is possible, I will not aim to address them here. I am content merely to
show that the vast majority of examples given—and the examples most often discussed—do not give us
any reason to separate final and intrinsic value.
22 See also Fletcher (2009).
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value as a means is not exhaustive. Signatory value, for example, is neither a kind of
instrumental value nor a kind of final value. The same is true of aesthetic value, eptpected
value, moral value, and attributive kinds of value, like being a good toaster or being a good umbrella.
So we cannot infer that the dress (or the pen, or the coat) has value as an end just because it
does not have value as a mere means.23
But there is something else telling in these passages: All of our authors seem to
endorse a kind of subjectivism about what is valuable. Throughout their papers, Korsgaard,
Kagan, and Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen use “valuable” and “valued” as synonyms.
This is critical: it allows them to move from claims about how we value Diana’s dress, for
instance, to claims about its value. But this is, I think, their second mistake—for such
subjectivism is not plausible.24
We can appeal to an old argument.25 First, remember that Kagan, Korsgaard, and
Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen seem to believe that something is good as an end if it
is valued as an end—otherwise they would not use “valued” and “valuable” as synonyms.
They should say also, then, that something is bad as an end if it disvalued as an end. But
there are some things that are valued by some, and hated by others. By the two principles the

Some conditionalists use the term “non-instrumental value” as a synonym for “final value.” (See e.g.
Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000)). They might then insist that the distinction is exhaustive. But
if the conditionalist wanted to talk only about non-instrumental value in this sense, then his thesis is
neither controversial nor inconsistent with Mooreanism. Moore never claimed that all non-instrumental
value is intrinsic, nor should any Moorean maintain such a view. There are simply too many kinds of noninstrumental values; it would be absurd to assume that, for example, being a good toaster is an intrinsic kind
of goodness. Since I do not believe that the conditionalist is radically mistaken about his own position and
what it is in conflict with, I will assume that when conditionalists speak of non-instrumental value this is
merely a somewhat confusing way of specifying a particular kind of non-instrumental value, rather than the
many kinds of value that fall under this label.
24 I do not mean to claim that no subjectivist program in meta-ethics can succeed. I mean to claim only
that the very simple kind of subjectivism advanced here is not plausible when applied to final value.
25 See e.g. Brentano (2009: 18-19): “How are we to know that a thing is good? Should we say that whatever
is loved or is capable of being loved is something that is worthy of love and therefore good? Obviously
this would not be right, and it is almost impossible to comprehend how it could be that some have fallen
in to such an error. One person loves what another hates.”
23
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conditionalist has accepted, it would then follow that some things are both finally good and
finally bad. But this is impossible.
This, I believe, reveals that the arguments given by the conditionalist can show only
that these three objects have a kind of relative value—a kind of value for a person. However it
is uncontroversial that final value is a kind of impartial value, a kind of value a thing has
“from the perspective of the universe.”26 27

§6: Sentimental Value
The standard conditionalist rationale says that (i) the pen, the dress, and the coat
each have a kind of value that is not merely instrumental and (ii) we can tell whether a thing
has this kind of value by examining how it makes a person feel. I think both (i) and (ii) are
plausible. However this is not because these things have final value. Rather it is because they
have sentimental value.
It is somewhat difficult to target sentimental value, but I hope that the concept is
relatively clear. Roughly, to be sentimentally valuable is to have the capacity to invoke our
sentiments. Sentimental value is thus primarily a property of particular things—an old
trophy, a letter from a friend, a photograph of a loved one—rather than states of affairs, or
This phrase comes, of course, from Sidgwick, who used it in a slightly different context. See his (1981:
382).
27 Some may object that I have misunderstood the conditionalist: perhaps she did mean to speak of a kind
of relative value. This cannot be, I think, for two reasons. First, consider the views provided. It would, I
think, be absurd to claim e.g. that something is good for a person when it directly contributes to the overall
value of the world. Second, and most significantly, consider the dialectic. Final value is nearly always
introduced in opposition to the Moorean notion of intrinsic value: the conditionalist points to Moore’s
concept, and explains that final value differs, in that it need not depend upon the intrinsic features of a
thing (see e.g. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000: 115-116), Kagan (1998: 278-279)). But
Moorean intrinsic value is impartial; indeed, Moore (infamously) rejected the notion of partial value
entirely. So if final value can be understood in relation to the Moorean concept of intrinsic value, as the
conditionalist claims, then it must be impartial. Further the conditionalist position has nearly always been
presented in opposition to the Moorean view (see e.g. Korsgaard (1983: 173), Rønnow-Rasmussen (2011:
8)). But if final value is supposed to be a relative kind of value, then the conditionalist position is entirely
consistent with Moore’s.
26
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universals.28 Metaphysically, sentimental value is a kind of extrinsic value: it arises because of a
certain relationship between a person and a thing. Finally, because persons may feel different
sentiments towards the same thing, sentimental value is relative: something is sentimentally
valuable for a person, not simpliciter.
By calling this kind of value “sentimental value,” I do not mean to suggest that it is
unimportant. Nor do I mean to suggest that a person who cares about things with
sentimental value is being mawkish, or ‘sentimental’ in the pejorative sense. Rather, I mean
this quite literally: “sentimental value” picks out a kind of value that exists because of our
sentiments.
As I hope is clear, sentimental value is not a kind of final value. Unlike sentimental
value, final value is impartial and cannot be discovered by noting how things make us feel.
But sentimental value is not instrumental value, either: a thing may have sentimental value,
even if it brings about nothing else worth having.29 30 This is not to deny that many things
with sentimental value will, in fact, possess instrumental value as well. But this is true of
almost all kinds of value—including final value, moral value, aesthetic value, and the like.
I believe that the examples the conditionalist has given are examples of sentimental
value, rather than final value.31 Let us examine how the explanation would go in each case.

It may sometimes be a property of events, also—as in the case of anniversaries.
In this I agree with Hatzimoysis (2003).
30 The distinction between sentimental and instrumental value can be given additional support in two
ways. First conceptually: if, as some philosophers do, we dispense with final value, we cannot speak of
instrumental value—if nothing has value as an end, then nothing has value as a means. But we can still
speak of sentimental value: this kind of value depends only on the existence of our sentiments. Second,
we may justify the distinction epistemically: We cannot know the instrumental value of a thing unless we
know the final value of what it brings about. But to know that a thing has sentimental value, for a person,
we just need to know how it affects him.
31 Fletcher (2009) argues that sentimental value is a kind of final value. I believe this is because Fletcher
assumes that sentimental value is either a kind of value as a means or a kind of value as an end. I think
this is a mistake: the distinction between value as an end and value as a means is not exhaustive. And
without this premise, I do not see how Fletcher’s argument can succeed.
28
29
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Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen say that if we idolize Diana, we may value her
dress as more than a mere means. This is true—we may value it sentimentally. Indeed,
because Diana is so closely associated with the dress, it will arouse the sentiments of any
person who cares about her, or her life. We can tell a similar story about the coat: the person
Korsgaard imagines has “put [the coat] on a list of the things he always wanted, or aspires to
have some day, right alongside adventure, travel, or peace of mind.” Thus given the coat’s
link to his hopes, and life plans, it will have the capacity to evoke his sentiments.
Kagan’s example may seem more like a case of impartial value. But this is only
because Lincoln’s pen has a pull on the emotions of so many. We feel strongly about
Lincoln, and the tremendous changes in history that he initiated. Because the pen is so
closely associated with him, and his most important actions, it will naturally arouse our
sentiments.
So the conditionalist has pointed us to an interesting kind of value, a kind of value
widely ignored in moral philosophy. But this kind of value is not final value—it is a partial,
relative value, created by persons and their sentiments.
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CHAPTER IV
ENDS AND VALUE AS AN END
Mooreans say that intrinsic goodness is the primary concept of value theory. The
notion is understood as suggested in the Principia: the intrinsic value of a thing depends only
on its intrinsic, non-moral features. Further, such value is essential to its bearers, persists in
isolation, and attaches only to finely grained entities, such as states of affairs. 1
Conditionalists hope to reform axiology; they argue that final value is fundamental.2 3
Moore conflated final and intrinsic value; he claimed that something is intrinsically good just
in case it is good as an end. But this identification is mistaken, they claim.
The conditionalist’s argument begins in the ontology of value: they dismiss the
Moorean presumption that axiology concerns only states of affairs; particular things may be
good as ends too. Elizabeth Anderson writes:
Persons are the immediate objects of our respect, benevolence, and love; beautiful
paintings of our admiring contemplation; pets of our affection; and so forth. These
are the things we rationally value [as ends].4 (1993: 19)
Next, the conditionalist argues that the final value of a particular may be conditional on its
extrinsic properties. The value of a beautiful painting may be conditional on whether it is

See Moore (1922: 260, 261), (1993: 21-22, 150, 171, 236), (2005: 32). Some philosophers do not believe in
states of affairs, but accept facts, tropes, propositions, or events. In general, these things may be substituted for
states of affairs without significantly changing the dialectic. However, we should pick just one of these
categories. It would be objectionable to attribute value e.g. to the state of affairs <Jones is pleased>, the
proposition that Jones is pleased and the fact that <Jones is pleased>.
2 Terminology varies: some philosophers use “intrinsic value” to refer to the value a thing has for its own sake,
and some other term like “intrinsic value proper” to refer to the value a thing has in virtue of its intrinsic
features (see e.g. Kagan (1998)). For ease of understanding, I will translate these authors to speak as Korsgaard
(1983) suggests: I will reserve “intrinsic value” for the Moorean concept and “final value” for the value
something has ultimately, as an end, or for its own sake. For more on terminology see Rønnow-Rasmussen and
Zimmerman (2005), and Zimmerman (2010).
3 These views have increased greatly in popularity in the last thirty years. See Korsgaard (1983), O’Neil (1992),
Green (1996), Kagan (1998), Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000), Olson (2004), and Dorsey (2012),
among others.
4 Anderson speaks most often of intrinsic value. But she does not take intrinsic value to be intrinsic—it is, for
her, merely the value a thing has as an end. See her (1993:3). Thus I will translate her comments here; see fn. 2.
1
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seen or appreciated; the goodness of a mink coat may depend on its being wanted or desired;
the final value of an artifact—like Lincoln’s Pen, or Lady Diana’s dress—may supervene on
its historical role.5
Thus intrinsic and final goodness cannot be equated, as Moore assumed—some
things have value as ends but do not have this value in virtue of their intrinsic features.
Further, once these concepts are separated, intrinsic value seems to lose significance.
Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen write:
What is so special about value that supervenes on the object’s internal rather than
relational properties…? One can easily see the normative relevance of the notion of
a final value…but the concept of an intrinsic value seems to lack a special normative
interest. (2000: 48-49)
And Kagan asks:
Why should this type of value [i.e. intrinsic value] be of any more interest to us as
value theorists than it would be to pick out the value that an object has on the basis of
its relational properties alone? Or the value that an object has on the basis of its 17place properties alone? (1998: 290)6
According to these philosophers, intrinsic goods are simply a subset of final goods:
something is intrinsically good just in case it is finally good in virtue of its intrinsic
properties.7 Further, this subset is normatively uninteresting—the difference between
intrinsic and non-intrinsic final goods is only metaphysical; it has no ethical significance.
Thus the orthodox Moorean account of value theory must be rejected: final value should
replace intrinsic value as the fundamental concept of axiology.

These examples of extrinsic, final goods (from Korsgaard (1983), Kagan (1998), and Rabinowicz and
Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000) respectively) are the most discussed—although I am unsure that they are, in fact,
examples of final goods (see my “The Pen, the Dress, and the Coat: A Confusion is Goodness”). But I will
ignore these concerns here. For general criticism of the conditionalist’s argument, as well as further discussion
and support of the Moorean view, see Bradley (2002).
6 Emphasis mine.
7 Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000: 34) write that this view “has nearly never been questioned, as far
as we know: it seems to be a general if not a universal view that all intrinsic values are final.”
5
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The Moorean may think this objection misguided. Conditionalists say that the
intrinsic value of a thing is simply the value it has intrinsically. But as I have stressed, Moore
believed also that intrinsic value is essential, persists in isolation, and attaches only to states
of affairs. Further, under Moore’s conception, intrinsic goods are importantly different from
other final goods: because Moorean goods have their value essentially, they are valuable
unconditionally.8
But though I am eager to defend the orthodoxy, I fear this brief defense cannot
succeed. The difference between conditional and unconditional goods is merely
metaphysical. And the bare difference between conditional and unconditional goods seems
no more significant than the bare difference between those things that are valuable in virtue
of their 1-place properties and those that are valuable in virtue of their 2-place properties.
The conditionalist’s objection remains.
Further defense is needed. Two options are available: first, we may stop the
conditionalist’s argument at its beginning and reject the division of final and intrinsic value.
Call this the identity defense. Alternatively, we may agree with the conditionalist that final and
intrinsic value differ, take up the challenge Kagan et al. advance, and show that intrinsic
goodness remains a significant concept. Call this the axiological defense.
My approach is unconventional; I employ both replies. This is because “final value”
is ambiguous; it may denote the value a thing has as an end or for its own sake, or it may
denote the value a thing has ultimately (i.e. non-derivatively). In the first case, the identity
defense may succeed—the value a thing has as an end is simply its intrinsic value. In the
second case, the axiological defense may succeed: though not all ultimate value is intrinsic

8

In fact, Korsgaard stresses this feature of Moorean goods in her (1983).
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value, the intrinsic value of a state of affairs is simply its ultimate value. Further, it is the
ultimate value of states that is most important to axiology.
Thus under either condition, the Moorean view may be preserved. I close by
examining ways to translate the conditionalist’s claims about the values of non-intrinsic
goods into the resulting program.

§1: The Identity Defense
If final value is distinct from intrinsic value, then the notion must somehow be
explained. Moore was careful to describe his concept; much of the Principia is dedicated to its
nature. In contrast, conditionalists often say very little: they simply insist that final value
differs from intrinsic value and reiterate that it is the value a thing has “as an end” or “for its
own sake.”9 But if this is what final value is, then the conditionalist is mistaken: final and
intrinsic value are identical.
Begin with the claim that the final value of a thing is the value it has as an end. If we
take this idea seriously, then we must insist that something cannot have final value unless it
can be an end—that is, a goal or objective. But only states of affairs can be goals or
objectives.10 Thus only states of affairs can have final value.
Indeed, consider the most powerful example in favor of the conditionalist ontology:
persons. Can a person be an end or goal? Kant writes:
Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature have, nevertheless, if
they are not rational beings, only a relative value as means and are therefore called
9 This

silence is widespread. Indeed though Korsgaard (1983), Stecker (2002), Green (1996), and Fletcher
(2009) all make extensive use of the concept of final value, they say only that it differs from intrinsic value and
employ these synonyms, without giving any substantive account of the concept.
10 Ross (2002: 113) writes: “Most of our adjectives, I suppose, refer to qualities that belong to substances;
‘good’ is the name of a quality which attaches, quite directly, only to ‘objectives,’ and since an objective is an
entity more complex than a substance, standing as it does for a substance’s having a certain quality or being in a
certain relation, ‘good’ may be called a quality of a different type from those that attach to substances.”
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things. On the other hand, rational beings are called persons inasmuch as their nature already
marks them out as ends in themselves. (1993: 36)11
But Kant is mistaken: persons cannot be ends or goals. Goals are the kinds of things we can
intend to bring about, or make the case. But I cannot bring about a person, or make her the
case. Indeed, it appears unintelligible to claim that e.g. Lucy is my goal but deny that, by this,
I mean that I intend to stand in some relation to Lucy or see to it that she instantiates some
feature.12 My goal may be to listen to Lucy, to speak with her, to learn from her—but my
goal cannot be Lucy herself.
Some point not to Kant, but to Aristotle. In the Nicomachean Ethics we read:
Since there are many actions, skills, and sciences, it happens that there are many ends
as well: the end of medicine is health, that of shipbuilding, a ship, that of military
science, victory, and those of domestic economy, wealth. (2000: 3, 1094a)
However, again, these claims cannot be literally true. The end of medicine is not simply the
universal, health—the doctor’s goal is for her patient to be healthy, to instantiate the property of
health. And the instantiation of a property is a state of affairs. Similarly for victory and
wealth. Nor does the ship builder aim at a ship, per se—a ship is not the kind of thing that we
can intend to bring about, or see to. Rather the ship builder’s aim is to create a ship. He might
also hope for the ship to be a certain way—for it to be sturdy, elegant, and so forth. But
these are states of affairs, not particulars or universals.
The same holds for the conditionalist’s examples: Lincoln’s pen, Diana’s dress, the
mink coat, and so on. We can only aim at states that involve such things; they cannot be goals
or ends.

Emphasis mine. Though Kant’s claims are often taken literally, this is perhaps a mistake. In the passage
quoted, Kant seem to mean only that persons are ends in so much as they are “something which is not to be
used merely as means and hence there is imposed thereby a limit on all arbitrary use of such beings, which are
thus objects of respect” (1993: 36).
12 See also Lemos (1994: 29).
11
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If we instead focus on the claim that what is finally good is what is good for its own
sake, we achieve the same result. According to a common platitude, what is good for its own
sake is what is desirable for its own sake. But a thing cannot be desirable unless it can be
desired. And we cannot desire particular things: we can only be close to them, own them,
and so on. The same is true of universals: though we may claim that we desire love, or
respect, what we truly want is to be loved or to be respected—we want these relations to be
instantiated. And the instantiation of a relation is a state of affairs.
I conclude that if we take either locution seriously we must say that only states of
affairs can possess final value. Thus the first step of the conditionalist’s argument against the
orthodoxy fails: particulars cannot possess final value and thus a fortiori cannot be examples
of non-intrinsic final goods.
Of course, the conditionalist might still insist that the final and intrinsic values of
states can differ. But this is not plausible. For the Moorean, the intrinsic value of a state is
intrinsic and essential; in particular, it depends only on its having the constituents it does. 13
Thus <Charlie is happy> is good because it is an instance of happiness, <Sally loves Linus>
is good because it is an instance of love, and so forth. But for any state, S, that appears to
I assume that it is intrinsic and essential to a state of affairs that it has the constituents it does. In the debate
between the Moorean and the conditionalist this is, to my knowledge, accepted universally (see e.g. Kagan
(1998), Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000), Zimmerman (2001)). Still, some argument can be
mustered if needed. My conception of states of affairs is inspired by Armstrong (1997); I say that states of
affairs are concrete entities that make propositions true. E.g. the state of affairs <Charlie is happy> makes it the
case that Charlie is happy, and so on. The constituents of a state of affairs are simply the particulars and
universals that make it up—in this case, the particular, Charlie, and the universal happiness. However in the same
way that the parts of a thing are intrinsic to it, so too are its constituents. (There are possible exceptions: e.g.
some may say that though the property being the only person is a constituent of the state of affairs <Charlie is the
only person> it is not intrinsic to that state, as it depends on what other states obtain. I am unsure that this
argument is sound. But, if it is, then I would be inclined to say that, despite appearances, the state in question
does not exist. Rather (when true) the proposition that Charlie is the only person holds because of some much
more complicated totality state of the form <<Charlie is a person> & <Charlie totals the universal of personhood>>.
See Armstrong (1997: 196-201).) Further, because states of affairs are truth-makers, they must have their
constituents necessarily; if they did not then <Charlie is happy> would not make it the case that Charlie is happy.
Rather, in some worlds, the very same state might have different constituents, and thus might fail to make
anything true about Charlie or might, instead, make him sad, or confused, or tall. For further argument see M.
Zimmerman (2001: 64), D. Zimmerman (1997).
13
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have its final value in virtue of some extrinsic or contingent feature, F, there will be some
wider state that includes this feature as a constituent—in the simple case, this will be a state
of the form <S is F>. This wider state contains everything necessary to give it value; it has its
final value intrinsically and essentially.
Thus for every conditionally valuable state, there will be an unconditionally valuable
state that contains its external good-making feature. Are both states good as ends? No, this
would be double counting: every conditional good would give rise to an unconditional good.
So we must choose. And we should, I believe, choose the wider state. These states afford a
complete explanation of their value—we do not need to appeal to anything outside of them.
Given that we are speaking of what is valuable for its own sake and as an end, I believe this
desirable.
Consider examples. Begin with some alleged conditional good: a friendship between
Linus and Sally. Suppose we think this state finally valuable only under the condition that it
makes Linus and Sally happy. We must then choose: should we attribute value to the narrow
state that consists of Linus and Sally being friends, or to the wider state that consists of
Linus and Sally being friends, and their friendship making them happy? As I have said, we
should not attribute value to both; this would be a kind of double counting. But it seems to
me that it would also be implausible to claim that though their friendship is good under the
condition that it is happy, their happy friendship is not good. The second option is thus
preferable: we should attribute final value to the wider state, their happy friendship. It is this
state that is valuable as an end; it is this goal that is desirable for its own sake.
Thus if “final value” refers to the value a thing has as an end or for its own sake,
then it attaches only to states of affairs. Further, we have reason to insist that the final value
of a state of affairs cannot differ from its intrinsic value. I conclude that the conditionalist
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has given no reason to divorce intrinsic and final value—and thus no reason to abandon the
Moorean orthodoxy.

§2: The Axiological Defense
However “final value” is not only used to refer to the value a thing has as an end; it
also may be used to refer to the value a thing has ultimately. Consider Rabinowicz and
Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000: 126):
One might still insist that value as an end can only accrue to proposition-like entities
such as states of affairs or facts. After all, ends are never things. Nor are they ever
persons, pace Kant…This means, however, that the term “value as an end” may not
be quite suitable for the kind of value we have in mind….Still, whereas “value as an
end” is for this reason misleading, the relevant values can be said to be “end-point
values,” insofar as they are not simply conducive to or necessary for something else
that is of value. They are “final,” then, in this sense of being “ultimate.”
Bykvist (2015) and Olson (2004) advance a similar conception. Final goods are, on this
account, those goods “at the end of the chain”: they ground and explain the value of other,
derivative goods.14 Let us say that something has derivative value just in case it has value
because something else does.15 We can then declare that something has final value just in
case its value is not derivative.16
Of course, some Mooreans insist that, even according to this conception, final value
attaches only to states of affairs.17 They thus hope to preserve the identity defense. However,
according to a widely held view, non-derivative goods are the fitting, ultimate objects of proWe might think that Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen mean only that we should understand final value
in opposition to the value a thing has as a means; final value is non-instrumental value. But this understanding
makes the conditionalist thesis trivial. Consider the value a thing has sentimentally, as a sign, as a person, as an
automobile, or as a toaster. These are all distinct from the value a thing has as a means. But it would be absurd
to claim that these kinds of value attach only to states of affairs, or that they are all intrinsic kinds of value.
15 I say that a thing has value because of some feature F if and only if F explains—partially or fully—the value of
that thing; F is a part of what makes that thing good.
16 Such accounts may need to be modified to handle complex goods: those things that have final value because of
the values of their parts. To accommodate these goods, we may say that a thing has non-derivative value just in
case it does not have its value because of the value of anything that is not a part of it.
17 See e.g. Zimmerman (2001: 37).
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attitudes.18 Some pro-attitudes take states of affairs as their objects—attitudes like desire or
hope. But others, like love and respect, take particulars as their objects. 19 Thus, if the fitting
attitude view is true, then particulars may have non-derivative value.
I am skeptical that we should endorse a fitting attitude account of ultimate value.20
But, for the sake of argument, I will not object. I thus concede that if final value is nonderivative value, then the identity defense fails. However, this does not doom the orthodoxy.
The Moorean’s task now is to show that the concept of intrinsic value is significant, even
when divorced from final value. But this is less difficult than it seems: though we cannot
identify final and intrinsic value, the separation is not complete.
First, note that all intrinsic value is ultimate value. If a state of affairs has its value in
virtue of its intrinsic features, it cannot have that value in virtue of the value of something
else. Thus the intrinsic value of a thing is non-derivative. Further, all ultimate value (of states) is
intrinsic value. The arguments run the same way: For any state, S, that appears to have its
ultimate value in virtue of some external or contingent feature, F, we simply include this
feature as a constituent; in so doing, we select a wider state of affairs, a state that contains
everything necessary to give it value. Such goods will have their value intrinsically and
necessarily; they will therefore be good unconditionally.

Such views originate with Brentano (2009: 18). See also Ewing (2012: 146-150), Lemos (1994: 6-16),
Anderson (1993: 19-20), Baron (1997:22), Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000: 125) and Zimmerman
(2001: 84-97), among many others.
19 Zimmerman (2001: 40-44) resists these claims; he argues that something has non-derivative value only if it’s
the fitting object of a rational pro-attitude—and that love is not rational. I accept his restriction, but I cannot
agree that love is irrational. Further, I cannot endorse Zimmerman’s claim that the ultimate objects of
uncontroversially rational attitudes such as respect are states of affairs. But I may be mistaken about this—and
I would welcome such a result: If Zimmerman is correct, then no further argumentation is needed in defense
of the Moorean orthodoxy.
20 I worry about the “wrong kind of reason” problem, and its ilk. For summary see Rønnow-Rasmussen (2011:
33-45). Interestingly, the problem does not apply if we believe that ultimate value is intrinsic. But of course no
such defense is available to the conditionalist.
18
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Thus the concept of ultimate value may be naturally divided. First, there is intrinsic
value—the kind of ultimate value that attaches to states of affairs. This kind of value is
characterized by the Moorean principles and may call for typically utilitarian responses such
as promotion and maximization. Second, there is non-intrinsic ultimate value—the kind of
final value that attaches to particulars. None of the Moorean principles hold for this kind of
value. Further, different attitudes are required: goods with this kind of final value may call
instead for care, respect, or maintenance.
Which kind of ultimate value is most important? Begin with rational choice. As
Aristotle suggests, whenever we act intentionally, we aim to bring about some end or goal.21
Thus what we have most reason to do must depend, at least in part, on the values of the
ends or goals that we can bring about. Brentano (2009: 12) writes:
This, therefore, is certain: there is a variety of ultimate ends. We must choose among
them. And since the ultimate end that we adopt is the determining principle of
everything else, the choice of ultimate ends is the most important choice of all…
Which end is the correct one?… Choose the best among the ends that are attainable:
this is the only adequate answer.
However, even if we do not accept such maximizing views, it is, I think, impossible to
provide a satisfactory account of rational choice that does not appeal to the value of the
objectives that we can bring about. Thus intrinsic value seems essential to any successful
account of rationality. But this is not true of non-intrinsic ultimate value. Nor is it clear that
such value has any direct bearing on rational choice.
Turn next to axiology. The traditional objects of study in value theory are lives,
outcomes, and possible worlds. This is for good reason: it makes sense to care about our
lives and the lives of those close to us; to care about the outcomes of our actions and the
actions of others; to care about the world, and the ways it could be. Because of this, it seems
21

(2000: 3, 1094a-1094b.)
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to me that questions about the values of these things have clear and immediate
importance—they deserve the attention that axiologists have devoted to them. But lives,
outcomes, and possible worlds are not particulars; they are states of affairs.22 And when we
ask about the values of such things, we are asking about their non-derivative or intrinsic
value: we are thinking about how good these things would be as ends, not as means; how
choice-worthy they are, in themselves.
Given this, intrinsic value is also critical to deontology. Many accounts of right
action, like Moore’s ideal utilitarianism, appeal to claims about the value of the world. We
cannot formulate or defend such theories without appealing to intrinsic value, nor can we
understand moderate views, like Ross’s, that tell us that we have a prima facie obligation to
make the world as good as it can be.
Of course the conditionalist may object that the goods they point to are equally
important. But this is not plausible. The conditionalist’s goods—things like coats, pens,
dresses, etc.—are clearly of lesser importance than the goods traditional value theory targets.
Perhaps Lincoln’s pen does have ultimate value, as conditionalists often claim. But it is
unclear what this kind of value is supposed to do, or why we ought to be concerned with it.
The conditionalist may here side with Kagan and reply that things like Lincoln’s pen
make the world a better place.23 Perhaps this gives us reason to be concerned with the value
of the pen, and other such goods. I must admit I do not find such claims convincing—but
perhaps they are more plausible when we consider other conditionalist goods, such as
beautiful artworks. However, even if Kagan’s thesis were true, this would make the
We can say that (i) the outcome of an action is the conjunction of the states of affairs that would obtain if it
were performed; (ii) the life of an individual is the conjunction of the states of affairs directly about that person
(that is, those atomic states that have that person as their subject) and (iii) that a possible world is a maximal,
consistent state of affairs. We can say that a state of affairs, w, is maximal and consistent just in case w is
possible and for any state of affairs s if s is not a part of w then it is impossible that <w & s> should obtain.
23 See his (1998).
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conditionalist’s goods significant only by association: I care about the world and its value; in
so much as this concerns me, I may be concerned with the ultimate value of particulars. But
if this is correct, it is still the value of the world that is primary.
Alternatively, the conditionalist may turn back to Kant: what, they ask, of the
ultimate value of persons? After all, persons are particulars, not states of affairs, and we have
clear reason to care about their value. I admit this; I think that we should be concerned with
the values of persons. But I am skeptical that we should be concerned with the ultimate
values of persons. Rather, I think we are concerned with their moral value—we want to know
whether they are good qua persons. However, ultimate value and moral value are distinct: the
ultimate value of a thing cannot depend on the values of other things; it is non-derivative.
But the moral value of a person may depend on the values of that person’s actions, virtues,
and history. (Further moral value is not, I think, the axiologist’s concern—these questions
belong to deontology.)
We may also be concerned with the values of a person’s life, or the values of their
actions, relationships, and so on. But these are all states of affairs. It is unclear to me that, in
addition to these things, we should be interested in the ultimate values of persons.24
Thus I believe that the orthodoxy is correct: the proper objects of study in axiology
are lives, outcomes, and possible worlds. And thus the fundamental kind of value we are
concerned with in axiology is the ultimate value of these things—or, equivalently, their
intrinsic value, or value as ends.
I conclude that the conditionalist is mistaken. It is likely true that intrinsic value is
simply a species of ultimate (i.e. final) value, as they claim. But intrinsic goods are importantly

This seems especially true, if, as most Kantians claim, the ultimate value of persons does not add to the
value of the world. See Anderson (1993: 97).
24
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different from other goods with ultimate value—they possess the kind of ultimate value that
is most important to axiology, rationality, and moral philosophy more broadly.

§3: A Translation Program
I have presented a dilemma. If the final value of a thing is its value as an end, then
final value may be identified with intrinsic value. If the final value of a thing is its ultimate
value, then we may say that intrinsic value is the most important kind of ultimate value.
Under either condition, the conditionalist’s argument fails.
But our defense can be further strengthened. The conditionalist intuition that entities
other than states of affairs may possess the kind of value most important to axiology is
powerful and widely shared. We cannot deliver this result—we can say only that such goods
can possess an inferior kind of ultimate value. Perhaps this is good enough. But I believe it
would be better if we could show that claims about the final value of particulars (and
perhaps even universals) can be translated into claims about the final values of states that
involve these goods. In this way, though we cannot attribute the most important kind of
value to conditionalist goods, we might attribute such value to states that are intimately
related to these goods.
Begin with particulars. Moore (1993: 171) inspires the most popular approach; he
writes: “when we assert that a thing is good, what we mean is that its existence or reality is
good.” Thus we might claim that:
Existence Reduction: When we say that some particular c is valuable intrinsically, or as
an end, we often mean only that the state <c exists> is valuable.
Moore’s claims are attractive and intuitive. But they have been widely rejected. Parfit writes:
[Moore’s] claims are mistakes. Something’s existence can be good though this thing
itself is not good, and vice versa. There are many bad people, for example, whose
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continued existence would be good as an end. When some good person is dying a
slow and painful death, the continued existence of this person may be bad as an end.
And there would be nothing good in the continued existence of good works of art if
no one could ever see them. (2011: 237)
Are such examples persuasive?
Begin with Parfit’s first case. It is certainly true that, in some sense, it may be good
for bad persons to exist. But in general, when we say that someone is a bad person we are
speaking of his character, or moral value, not his intrinsic value. And moral value and
intrinsic value are distinct. But perhaps Parfit means that it may be good as an end for a
person who is bad as an end to exist. It is hard to understand this claim, however, and harder
still to see why it might be true. I am inclined to think that if we accept that a person is
intrinsically bad, then we must be willing to accept that their existence is intrinsically bad too.
What about Parfit’s second example—the good man, dying painfully? Here again
there seems to be confusion between moral value and intrinsic value: the natural
interpretation is to imagine a good person whose existence is bad. But this is consistent with
the existence reduction scheme.
However, Parfit’s third case will, I fear, undermine Moore’s claims. Suppose we
believe that the value of some work of art, A, is conditional on its being seen and
appreciated. If this is correct, then the Moorean cannot understand the claim A has value as
an end as a claim about the value of the state <A exists>. This state would have intrinsic value
only under the condition that A is seen—and A’s being seen is not intrinsic to <A exists>.
Thus the value of <A exists> would be extrinsic. And this is inconsistent with the program
advanced.
There are other worries. Suppose we say that some particular, B, is intrinsically
valuable. Our translation asks us to understand this assertion in terms of a claim about the
state <B exists>. But what is it about a state like <B exists> that makes it good? Consider
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again a state like <Charlie is happy>. This state is good because of its constituents—because it is an
instance of happiness. But this cannot be our explanation for the value of a state like <B
exists >—unless we wish to claim that every existential state of affairs, or every state about B,
is good as an end.25
So Moore’s translation scheme must be rejected. However, as I have argued, in any
case where the value of a state appears to depend upon something external, the Moorean can
attribute value to some wider state that includes those features. Thus we attribute value not
to the state <A exists> but to <A is seen and appreciated>. When we do, we include one of A’s
alleged good-making properties—one of the features that makes us say that A is intrinsically good.
This will solve the problem Parfit raised. Further, if we include all such features, we can
solve the second problem as well; we can explain the value of a state by appealing to its
constituents. More generally:
Good-Making Reduction: When we attribute intrinsic value to a concrete particular c
that is supposed to be made good by some features F1…Fn, we often mean only that
the state <c is F1…Fn > is valuable.26 27
I believe we should accept such accounts.
If we wish, we may also extend our strategy to universals. Again, it is true that we
often attribute value to properties like wisdom or bravery, or relations like love. But it is easy
enough to translate these claims. Chisholm proposes that:
In saying, for example, that knowledge is intrinsically good we mean, more exactly, that
that state of affairs which is someone knowing something is intrinsically good. And
in saying that pain is intrinsically bad, we mean that that state of affairs which is
someone being in pain (“someone experiencing painfully”) is one that is intrinsically
bad.
Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000) present an argument in a similar spirit.
Zimmerman suggests a similar scheme; see his (2001: 40).
27 Of course translation may not always be possible (see fn. 14). But it seems to me that the translation can
succeed for nearly all of the most common examples of extrinsic final goods.
25
26

53

If we accept Chisholm’s proposal, we may say:
Existential Instantiation: When we say that some universal U is valuable intrinsically, or
as an end, we often mean only that the state of affairs <Something is U> is valuable.
Chisholm’s proposal is attractive. But I am skeptical of the notion of existentially quantified
states of affairs. Further, I believe that when we claim that a universal is valuable, we are not
trying to attribute value to just one state of affairs, but to a whole family.
I admit that these concerns may not be decisive. But for those who share my
intuitions, I suggest we endorse:
Atomic Instantiation: When we say that a universal is valuable intrinsically, or as an end,
we often mean only that any atomic instantiation of that universal would have
value.28
I am inclined to think that such schemes may succeed. Often, when we appear to attribute
value to romantic love, for example, we are not praising the relation—we are declaring that
we value states of the world in which two persons love each other. And similarly for other
universals, such as bravery or wisdom.
Thus we need not reject all claims about the intrinsic values of things other than
states of affairs. Such claims cannot be literally true—but they may often be used to say
something that is.

The restriction to atomic states of affairs is necessary since, by saying that we value bravery as an end, we do
not mean to commit ourselves to the claim that we value any molecular state that has, as a part, an instantiation
of bravery—e.g. <Jones is brave & Jones is suffering greatly>.
28
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CHAPTER V
REASONS AND GOODNESS: MOORE, BRENTANO, AND SCANLON
G.E. Moore’s Principia Ethica was revolutionary. But it was not entirely without
precedent. Moore writes:
When this book had been already completed, I found, in Brentano’s ‘Origin of the
Knowledge of Right and Wrong,’ opinions far more closely resembling my own,
than those of any other ethical writer with whom I am acquainted. (1993: 36)
Both Moore and Brentano were metaethical non-naturalists;1 both believed that intrinsic
value is the fundamental concept of axiology;2 both said that the right may be defined in
terms of the good.3 But their systems differ ontologically: Moore claimed that intrinsic
goodness is fundamental, and cannot be analyzed. Brentano argued that correctness is
primary: to be intrinsically good is to be correct to intrinsically love.
The Principia is still widely read and discussed; the Origin is mostly forgotten. Yet
Brentano seems to have quietly defeated Moore: while few endorse Moore’s claims about the
indefinability of goodness, the analysis presented in the Origin inspired an army of allies,
including Broad (1930), Brandt (1946), Ewing (1948), Chisholm (1986), Scanlon (1998),
Zimmerman (2001), Rønnow-Rasmussen (2011), and Parfit (2011)—among others. All are
now called fitting-attitude theorists, though not all claim that the good is that which it is
fitting to favor—some say instead that a thing is valuable when we are required to respect it,
or when we have reason to care about it. But all say that the deontic concept they employ—
whether it is correctness, fittingness, requirement, or reason—is fundamental, and that

See e.g. Moore (1993: 58-59), Brentano (2009: 17-18).
Moore (1993: 78); Brentano (2009: 18).
3 Moore (1993: 196-197); Brentano (2009: 13, 32).
1
2
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goodness is derivative. Thus, as Chisholm claimed, such views reduce axiology to
deontology.4
In general, fitting-attitude theorists advance few arguments; they are content to
present their reduction and rely upon its intuitive appeal.5 But some of Brentano’s
contemporary successors hope for more: they wish to justify their position over the
Moorean alternative. Thus Scanlon (1998) claims the Moorean view fails because it suggests
that the goodness of a thing gives us additional reason to value it; Jacobson (2011) claims
that it does not adequately explain what plural goods have in common; Stratton-Lake and
Hooker (2006) say that it cannot account for the supervenience of the moral upon the nonmoral.
I defend the Moorean view; I reject such claims. I first present and explicate what I
take to be the most powerful form of the fitting-attitude view. After, I examine the
arguments of Scanlon et al.; I claim that, in each case, the objection to the Moorean program
is either unsound, or applies equally to the fitting-attitude theory. I conclude that, if there are
good reasons to prefer Brentano’s program, they have not yet been advanced.

§1: Brentano and Scanlon
Brentano hoped to discover the foundation of our obligations. Like Moore, he
claimed that the moral status of our actions is determined by facts about the intrinsic values
of our ends. But Brentano was not content to take goodness as primitive; rather, he claimed
that:
We call a thing good when the love relating to it is correct. In the broadest sense of
the term, the good is that which is worthy of love, that which can be loved with a
love that is correct.
4
5

See his (1986: 53).
See e.g. Ewing (1948), Chisholm (1986), Zimmerman (2001), and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2011), among others.
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But while Brentano’s view is historically significant, I believe it is unattractive. If goodness is
to be defined in terms of correctness, then correctness must be more fundamental than
goodness. But this is difficult to maintain: the notion of correctness is obscure and Brentano
says little about its nature.6 The Moorean is rightly cautious; he claims that we should not
trade a notion we understand, like goodness, for one that we do not.
Most of Brentano’s followers encounter the same problem in a milder guise: they
suggest that we analyze goodness in terms of fittingness, or requirement. But outside of the
very analyses they provide, the normative significance of these concepts is unclear.
However, the most recent versions of the fitting-attitude theory are, in this way, a
significant advance. The analysis presented in Scanlon’s influential (1998), and the nearly
identical views defended by Stratton-Lake and Hooker (2006), Parfit (2011), and RønnowRasmussen (2011), explain value not in terms of fittingness or correctness, but in terms of
reasons. The Moorean concern is thus undermined: talk of reasons is ubiquitous in moral
philosophy, and the concept has clear normative significance. Further, Scanlon’s view is, at
present, the most popular and most discussed form of the fitting-attitude analysis. It is, I
think, an appropriate standard bearer. (I show in an note how our arguments may apply if we
prefer some alternative.)
Scanlon’s analysis begins with an account of what it is to value goods:
To value something is to take oneself to have reasons for holding certain positive
attitudes toward it... (1998: 95)7 8
However, to believe something is valuable is not merely to value it. Rather:
Further, I fear some of Brentano’s most important beliefs about correctness are implausible; see, for example,
his claim at (2009: 22) that there is a phenomenological quality to experiences of correctness.
7 Scanlon also appeals to certain types of ‘pro-actions,’ such as maintenance and preservation. For ease of
exposition, I will not mention pro-actions, but this omission is not meant to be philosophically significant.
8 For the sake of variety, I will sometimes speak of ‘favor’ or ‘care’ instead. I do not take these to be particular
attitudes; as I use these terms, to care about a thing, or favor it, is simply to hold some pro-attitude towards it.
6

57

…To claim that something is valuable (or that it is “of value”) is to claim that others
also have reason to value it, as you do. (Ibid.)
Thus we may say that, according to Scanlon:
x is good = df. we all have sufficient reason to hold a pro-attitude towards x.9
The list of pro-attitudes is left open-ended: Scanlon mentions protection, promotion, and
preservation; Parfit (2011) appeals to desire, choice, and production—but we may add
different attitudes depending on what we believe to be good. The appropriate response will
be determined by the ontological category of the value bearer: states of affairs may call for
desire and promotion, persons for care and love, historical artifacts for maintenance, and so
on.
The account is therefore attractive: it explains goodness in terms of reasons, a critical
normative notion, and is neutral about what kinds of things may be good (and thus
consistent with nearly all substantive views in axiology.) But it is incomplete. Scanlon—and
most of his allies—simply define ‘good’ without explaining what kind of goodness they
target, or how it relates to the traditional objects of axiology. This will not suffice; if
Scanlon’s view is to compete with the Moorean account, it must provide an analysis of
intrinsic goodness.
So we should complete our explication of Scanlon’s account by restricting it. Parfit
suggests that, when analyzing intrinsic value, we should appeal only to reasons that are
generated by the intrinsic properties of goods.10 Thus:

The universal quantifier here not only enables us to distinguish between what we care about and what we
believe is valuable, but also allows for partial, or agent relative, reasons. For example, Scanlon claims that we
may have most reason to care about our own children. But, he suggests, few wish to say that their children are
better than all others. Scanlon’s program allows for this partiality. If goodness is linked to reasons, then so,
presumably, is the better than relation. If we assume that the strength of our reasons to value a thing will
determine its value, we can say:
x is better than y = df. everyone has stronger reason to value x than to value y.
If this account is correct, then we may each have most reason to care about our children, even if they are not
better than all others.
9
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x is intrinsically good =df. the intrinsic properties of x give everyone sufficient
reason to value it.11 12

§2: Fundamentality and Double Counting
In some ways, the Moorean program is not so different from Scanlon’s. Both will
agree that the intrinsic value of a thing supervenes on its intrinsic features. And, if we claim
with Moore that only states of affairs may be intrinsically valuable, then (given that the
intrinsic features of states of affairs are metaphysically necessary) both systems will entail
that the intrinsic value of a thing is essential and persists in isolation. Finally, since the
Moorean will likely think that we have reason to value what is valuable, he may accept the
biconditional this account entails: he may say that things are intrinsically good just when
their intrinsic properties give us reason to value them.
However, the systems disagree about what is fundamental. Both accounts are forms
of monistic non-naturalism—but for Moore, the sole unanalyzed normative concept is the
property intrinsic goodness; for Scanlon, it is the relation provides an intrinsic reason to value. Thus if
we accept the fitting-attitude theory, we will say that reasons are fundamental and goodness
is derivative: things are valuable because we have reason to value them. The Moorean reverses the

See his (2011: 52).
Note also that this will enable us to avoid the wrong kind of reason problem and its ilk. The argument usually
appeals to an example; we imagine that if we do not favor a saucer of mud, a demon will punish us. Thus we
have reason to favor the mud, but it is not good. (For further discussion see Jacobson (2011) and RønnowRasmussen (2011: 33-42)). No such objection applies to our account; the fact that a demon will punish us is, of
course, extrinsic to the mud.
12 We may wish to claim that we can have reason to hold some attitude only if we can. If so, then we should say
instead that:
x is intrinsically good =df. the intrinsic properties of x give us all sufficient reason to care about it, if
we can.
10
11
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order of explanation. He thinks goodness is fundamental and reasons derivative; he says that
we have reason to value things because they are valuable.13
Thus on the Moorean account, we may have reason to care about a thing because it
is good. But on Scanlon’s account, this is not possible: according to the fitting-attitude
analysis, to say that we have reason to care about something because it is good is to say that
we have reason to care about it because we have reason to care about it. And this cannot be:
the because of or in virtue of relation is irreflexive. Thus on Scanlon’s account it is only the
natural properties of things—like their pleasantness—that can give us reason.
This difference grounds perhaps the most popular argument against the Moorean
system. Scanlon writes:
[W]hen I consider particular cases it seems that these reasons [i.e. reasons to value
goods] are provided by the natural properties that make a thing good or valuable. So,
for example, the fact that a resort is pleasant is a reason to visit it or to recommend it
to a friend, and the fact that a discovery casts light on the causes of cancer is a reason
to applaud it and to support further research of that kind. These natural properties
provide a complete explanation of the reasons we have for reacting in these ways to
things that are good or valuable. It is not clear what further work could be done by special
reason-providing properties of goodness and value, and even less clear how these properties could
provide reasons. (1998: 97).14
Indeed, to claim that the goodness of a thing can give us reason to value a thing, as the
Moorean must, seems to commit us to a kind of double counting; we would have to say that
when some resort is pleasant and therefore good, we have two separate reasons to
Scanlon writes, “[The Moorean believes] that when something has the right natural properties it has the
further property of being valuable, and that property gives us reason to behave or react in certain ways with
regard to it…The alternative, which I believe to be correct, is to hold that being good, or valuable, is not a
property that itself provides a reason to respond to a thing in certain ways. Rather, to be good or valuable is to
have other properties that constitute such reasons” (1998: 97). Of course, we could, in principle, reject
Scanlon’s description of the Moorean position; we might say that our reasons to value things are independent
of their values. But this would be implausible. The indefinability of goodness is merely a part of the overall
Moorean system in moral philosophy. If that system is to be complete, it must give some account of all the
moral concepts of significant concern, as Moore attempted in the Principia. Thus the Moorean must provide
some account of what we have reason to value, and given the nature of his system, I believe he should attempt
to explain our reasons to value things in terms of their values.
14 Emphasis mine. Though I will make use of his examples in what follows, I am admittedly hesitant about the
cases Scanlon gives; it is, I think, unclear whether resorts or research projects can have intrinsic value.
13
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recommend it. Indeed, whenever something is made good by some natural property, we will
have two reasons—one provided by these natural properties, and another provided by its
goodness.
The argument then, is simple enough: If the Moorean account were true, then the
goodness of a thing would provide reason to value it. But the goodness of a thing does not
provide reason to value it. So, the Moorean view is not true.
But though this argument may be initially appealing, it is unsound. Scanlon’s concern
is grounded in questions about how the goodness of a thing can give us additional reason to
value it. The objection thus assumes the Moorean will agree with Scanlon et al. that the
natural properties of a thing give us some reason to value it. But we should deny this.15
Rather, the Moorean should insist that we have reason to recommend some resort,
applaud some line or research, or desire some outcome, only because it is good. The natural
properties of a thing matter, we argue, only in that they make things good. Thus when we
say that we should recommend some resort because it is pleasant, we may speak truly by
speaking elliptically: because being pleasant makes things good, and because the goodness of
a thing gives us reason to value it, we can appeal to the pleasantness of a thing to justify
claims about our reasons to favor it. But there is only one reason in such cases: the reason
provided by that thing’s goodness.
Of course, the fitting-attitude theorist may stubbornly note that, according to the
defense suggested, the claim that we have reason to recommend some resort because it is
pleasant is still false, if understood literally. This is admittedly counterintuitive. But the
fitting-attitude theorist must pay a similar price; as we have seen, he must deny that we have

Indeed, though they ultimately reject the Moorean position, this is roughly the defense that Stratton-Lake
and Hooker (2006) suggest.
15
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reason to value things because they are valuable. And this is unfortunate also: it is at best
strange to deny that we may have reason to care about something because it is good.
Thus Scanlon’s argument is unpersuasive. Both views face intuitive costs—the
Moorean must deny that we have reason to value things because (for example) they are
pleasant; Scanlon must deny that we have reason to value things because they are valuable.
We approach a draw.

§3: The Grounding Argument
But I fear this draw is illusory. Though I am hesitant to damage the account I prefer,
we must note that a powerful objection is now available to Scanlon. Let S be some state of
affairs. The because of or in virtue of relation is transitive. Thus I think the following inference
legitimate:
(1) S is intrinsically good because it is pleasant.
(2) We have reason to value S because it is intrinsically good.
(3) So, we have reason to value S because it is pleasant.
The Moorean position advanced holds that claims like (1) and (2) may be true: it admits that
things may be good because they are pleasant and that the values of things give us reason to
value them. But it insists that claims like (3) must be false; the natural properties of things
cannot give us reason to value them. If this transitivity argument is legitimate, as it appears,
then this position cannot be sustained.
We might claim this argument invalid because of equivocation. We say that (1)
appeals to a fact about metaphysical explanation: it specifies the good-making features of
S—the properties that ground and explain its value. But (2) appeals to a fact about reasons;
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it says that the fact that S is intrinsically good provides a reason to value it. Thus the
argument is, in fact:
(1*) The fact that S is pleasant grounds the fact that S is intrinsically good.
(2*) The fact that S is intrinsically good gives us reason to value S.
(3*) So, the fact that S is pleasant gives us reason to value S.
And this inference, we say, is illegitimate.
However, this defense cannot succeed. If some fact gives us a reason, then this fact
grounds the further fact that we have this reason. Thus (2*) entails:
(2**): The fact that S is intrinsically good grounds the fact that we have reason to
value S.
But the grounding relation is transitive. Thus (2**) and (1*) entail that:
(3**) The fact that S is pleasant grounds the fact that we have reason to value S.
However, if some fact grounds our reason to have some attitude, then this fact gives us
reason to have that attitude.16 Thus (3**) entails (3*).
I cannot see a way out. The standard Moorean defense must be rejected: we cannot
deny that the natural properties of things can give us reason to value them. But I refuse to
abandon the Moorean program. Rather, I hope to advance a new defense. And, surprisingly,
it is a defense we may take from the opposition.
Return to the fitting-attitude view. Scanlon says it entails that we cannot have reason
to favor things because they are good. In an important passage, Parfit demurs. We read:
Scanlon claims… [that a] thing’s goodness could not give us reasons. Such goodness
is the property of having other properties that might give us certain reasons, and the
second-order fact that we had these reasons would not itself give us any
reason[s]…This view needs, I think, one small revision. If some medicine or book is
We might deny this, and end the argument here. But though I recognize this as a conceptual possibility, I
cannot convince myself that this principle is false. If, however, I am mistaken, then this is simply another way
to resist the objection stated.
16
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the best, these facts could be truly claimed to give us reason to take this medicine, or
to read this book. But these would not be further, independent reasons. These reasons
would be derivative, since their normative force would derive entirely from the fact
that made this medicine or book the best. That is why it would be odd to claim that
we had three reasons to take some medicine: reasons that are given by the facts that
this medicine is the safest, the most effective, and the best. (2011: 38)
Parfit’s claim, then, is that the fitting-attitude theorist should maintain (i) that the values of
things may give us derivative reasons to favor them but (ii) only the natural properties of
things generate non-derivative reasons. This approach preserves our intuitions: we may
claim, as we do pretheoretically, that both the values of things and their natural properties
give us reason to value them. But we do not need to worry about double counting, Parfit
claims: when we consider the strength of our reasons in favor of holding some attitude, we
consider only the non-derivative reasons. This is because derivative reasons are not
independent, and thus do not provide additional support.17
The position Parfit suggests is therefore attractive. But—though this has not been
recognized—Parfit’s position is not actually available to him, or to Scanlon. We cannot have
reason to value things because we have reason to value them: as I have stressed, the because of
relation is irreflexive. And thus, on the accounts they advance, we cannot have reason to
value things because they are good—regardless of whether this reason is derivative or nonderivative.
However the position Parfit suggests is available to the Moorean; the reflexivity
argument does not apply to his program.18 Further Parfit’s suggestion may, I believe, help us

In fact, I am somewhat unconvinced by this claim: I do not think that Parfit’s account of derivative reasons
shows why they are not independent, nor why they should not count when we consider our reasons to value
goods. The simple fact that some reason gets is power from some other source does not show that it cannot
provide additional reason. (I am thankful to Bradford Skow for raising this concern.) However, I believe that
the account of derivative reasons I suggest below for the Moorean may overcome this worry.
18 We might worry about a kind of parody argument:
(4) S is intrinsically good because it is pleasant.
(5) We have non-derivative reason to value S because it is intrinsically good.
(6) So, we have non-derivative reason to value S because it is pleasant.
17
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escape the objection posed. Let us say that some fact gives us derivative reason to have some
attitude just in case it grounds some further fact and this fact gives us reason on its own to
have that attitude. And let us say, similarly, that some fact provides non-derivative reason just
in case it gives us reason to have some attitude, regardless of what other facts it grounds, or
makes true.
When combined with the Moorean account, it then follows that (i) the natural
properties of things generate derivative reasons but (ii) only the values of things can generate
non-derivative reasons. Thus for example, the pleasantness of some state gives us derivative
reason to value it: its pleasantness makes it good, and this goodness gives us non-derivative
reason to value it. Further, the double counting concern is avoided: derivative reasons only
count inasmuch as they make it true that some non-derivative reason obtains. Thus in
counting the non-derivative reasons, we have, in a sense, already accounted for the force of
the derivative reasons; these non-derivative reasons contain the force of the derivative

But this argument truly is invalid. Suppose we expand the argument, as before. Then we will claim:
(4*) The fact that S is pleasant grounds the fact that S is intrinsically good.
(5*) The fact that S is intrinsically good gives us non-derivative reason to value S.
(6*) So, the fact that S is pleasant gives us non-derivative reason to value S.
Now, by invoking the principles I used before, we infer from (4*) and (5*) that:
(6**) The fact that S is pleasant grounds the fact that we have non-derivative reason to value S.
But here the arguments diverge, for our (6*) does not follow from (6**). This is because though the
conditional:
(C) If F grounds the fact that we have reason to value S then F gives us reason to value S
is true, the conditional:
(C*) If F grounds the fact that we have non-derivative reason to value S then F gives us nonderivative reason to value S
is false. To provide a non-derivative reason to value something, a fact must, as it were, be at the ‘top of the
reason chain.’ But to simply provide reason (whether derivative or otherwise), a fact may sit anywhere in the
chain. Similarly, a fact may ground some further fact by simply being anywhere in the ‘grounding chain.’ Thus
(C) is true, for the respective notions of reason and ground ‘match up’; (C*) is false because they do not. Of
course the conditional:
(C**) If F is the immediate ground of the fact that we have non-derivative reason to value S then F
gives us non-derivative reason to value S
is true. But this will not save the argument, because the fact that S is pleasant is not the immediate ground of the
fact that we have non-derivative reason to value S.
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reasons. We thus need only consider our non-derivative reasons in determining what we
should value. The double counting concern dissolves.
The resulting position thus enables the Moorean to overcome the objection stated
and preserve our intuitions about the sources of our reasons—something Scanlon’s view
cannot do. The draw is thus illusory, after all: the Moorean view comes out ahead.

§4: The Pluralism Argument
Scanlon’s concern—and the grounding objection it inspires—is unsound. Those
who prefer the fitting-attitude account must provide further argument.
Some appeal to pluralism about intrinsic value. If there are, as the pluralist claims,
many fundamentally distinct kinds of intrinsic goods, then there is a further challenge: what
unifies these goods? What do e.g. pleasure and beauty have in common that makes them
both intrinsically valuable? Those who follow Scanlon may explain that these goods are all
alike in that we have reason to value them. Jacobson (2011) writes:
The motivation for adopting an FA [fitting-attitude] theory becomes clearer when
one moves from a single case, especially the paradigmatic good of pleasure, to other
good things. Consider a plausible list of intrinsic values: pleasure, beauty, friendship,
and knowledge…Someone might wonder what these things have in common, in
virtue of which they are good. Of course there may be no answer, if it is just a brute
fact that there are four intrinsic goods, which resemble each other simply in having
the property of goodness…[But] perhaps what unifies these goods is something
about human attitudes. Maybe pleasure, knowledge, beauty, and friendship are all
desirable or admirable things, where this means not that we can desire or admire
them but that we should (ought, have reason to) do so.19
Thus the fitting-attitude theorist can say that pleasure and beauty are alike in that we have
reason to value them. But the Moorean has no account of what plural goods have in
common; because intrinsic goodness is a primitive, we have no recourse for further

See also Scanlon (1998: 97-98)—though Scanlon’s argument also contains elements of the concern I raise in
fn. 20. For further discussion see Stratton-Lake and Hooker (2006).
19
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explanation.20 Thus, again, we have reason to reject the Moorean view, and accept Scanlon’s
alternative.
I believe this argument is, at best, inconclusive. Remember that, according to the
fitting-attitude theorist:
x is intrinsically good =df. the intrinsic properties of x give everyone sufficient
reason to value it.
Thus to claim that pleasure and beauty are alike in that we have reason to value them is
simply to say that they are alike in that they are good. It is thus unclear that the fittingattitude theorist has any explanation of the feature that all and only intrinsic goods share
(besides, of course, goodness).
Further, even if we accept that the fitting-attitude theorist can explain what plural
goods have in common, this would not be decisive. This is because the fitting-attitude
theorist cannot explain what plural goods have in common that makes them reasonable to
value. But this need not be a brute fact on the Moorean account: if we connect reasons and
value in the way I have suggested, then we may say that we have reason to value these things
because they are good.
Thus we are faced not with an argument, but a choice: we may explain why things are
good, or explain why we have reason to value them. We cannot do both.21
In fact, I think this argument is somewhat poorly stated. Value pluralism cannot be understood as the view
that there are many different kinds of intrinsic goods, as I argue in my “Two Kinds of Value Pluralism.” But
for the sake of argument, I will not object here.
21 There is another argument about pluralism lurking—but this concerns not value pluralism but pluralism
about reasons. It seems on the Moorean view we are committed to a kind of monism about intrinsic reasons;
we must claim that we have intrinsic reason to value things only because they are valuable. But it seems that e.g.
our reasons to recommend a resort are very different from our reasons to praise some line of research. (I am
thankful to Peter Graham for making this objection clear to me.) However, this concern can, I believe, be
ameliorated in three ways. First, it is not clear that either of these things are in fact examples of intrinsic goods,
and our reasons to value clear examples of intrinsic goods (like different instances of pleasure) appear more
homogenous. Second, the Moorean view is committed only to monism about non-derivative reasons. Thus our
derivative reasons to recommend a resort may be very different from our reasons to value some line of
research. Third, though fundamentally we have reason to value things only because they are good, things may
20
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§5: The Supervenience Argument
As I have stressed, both Moore and Brentano embrace non-naturalism: their systems
declare that goodness is unanalyzable in terms of natural properties. Given this, they must
explain the relation between the moral and the non-moral. Of course, the moral facts
supervene upon non-moral (or natural) facts—but why?22
The explanation is immediate for the naturalist: he thinks moral facts are natural
facts. And it is unnecessary for the anti-realist: he denies there are such facts. It is thus a
special problem for non-naturalists like Moore, Brentano, and Scanlon. And since the
publication of Blackburn’s (1971), critics have claimed it is a challenge they cannot meet.23
Stratton-Lake and Hooker argue that, in this way, the two programs are not alike.
Scanlon can easily explain the supervenience of the moral upon the non-moral; Moore
cannot. They write:
[O]n Scanlon’s view, goodness is not a simple indefinable property, but is the
property of having other properties that give us reason to care….[G]iven this account
of goodness, there is no mystery why it must supervene upon other properties. It
must supervene on other properties, because it is the property those properties have
of providing reasons. For Scanlon, reasons just are such properties of things as that
they produce pleasure or might lead to an improvement in our understanding of
cancer. The reasons to care about things are properties that can be described without
use of the concept of ‘practical reasons.’ Goodness, in turn, is the non-natural
property those properties have of providing reasons. (2006: 163-164).

be good for very different reasons. Thus there is still a kind of pluralism here—it is simply a little bit deeper in
our explanatory chain.
22 The fundamental concept of moral supervenience is simple enough: we claim that there cannot be a
difference in the moral facts without a difference in the non-moral (i.e. natural) facts. This slogan is perhaps
best understood as a claim of strong supervenience, i.e.:
Necessarily, if a thing x has some moral property F, then there is some non-moral property G (which
may be disjunctive, conjunctive, negative, etc.) such that, necessarily, anything that has G has F.
For an exhaustive survey of the various interpretations of moral supervenience, see McPherson (2015).
23 In fact, it is unclear just what Blackburn’s concern was—and there is still significant debate. But I am
interested only in the supervenience argument as Stratton-Lake and Hooker present it; I believe this is the only
version of the supervenience argument that has been advanced in the debate between the Moorean and the
fitting-attitude theorist. Thus if I can undermine their concern, then I will have defended the Moorean view
adequately for my purposes. But I do not pretend that this is the only version of the supervenience argument,
nor do I insist that Stratton-Lake and Hooker’s argument is related to Blackburn’s concern in the way they
claim.
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Thus, if we accept Scanlon’s view, then the supervenience of the reason facts upon the nonmoral facts is analytic; it is a “conceptual truth that if you have a reason to care about A,
then there must be something that provides that reason. This something is what the reason
supervenes on.” And given that the facts about goodness just are facts about reasons, this
explanation holds for the axiological facts as well.
However, we should not accept these claims too quickly. As stated, the argument is
unpersuasive. Suppose the fact that Linus is kind gives me reason to care about him. It does
not follow, from this mere fact, that our reason to care about him supervenes upon his
kindness. Indeed, supervenience might fail: even if Linus’s kindness gives us reason to value
him in the actual world, could there not be some possible where Linus’s kindness does not
provide this reason?24
Further, it is not clear that it is analytic that we cannot have a reason without a
ground. Consider our reason to act rightly. We may ask: what grounds this? What fact gives
us this reason? It does not seem to me incoherent to say that there is no such fact.
Still, I think these objections can likely be overcome. And besides, there is a more
serious problem lurking. Stratton-Lake and Hooker’s argument can succeed only if the
Moorean cannot find an equally satisfying explanation of supervenience. But a general (and
quite simple) explanation of supervenience is available to the non-naturalist, regardless of
whether he accepts the Moorean position or Scanlon’s alternative. Given this, I believe that
the special explanation postulated is unnecessary and the claimed advantage of Scanlon’s
position is illusory.

24

I am thankful to Phillip Bricker for raising this objection.
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We should separate our tasks. Moral facts divide into two categories: moral principles
and derived truths.25 I first show that the supervenience of moral principles is trivial, and
therefore does not require explanation. Next, I argue that the supervenience of the derived
truths is entailed by the truth of moral principles.
Moral principles differ in subject matter, but are alike in form. Begin with right action.
It is now standard to say that all such theories assert that:
An act is right if and only if (and because) it is A.
Such principles thus (i) specify necessary and sufficient conditions for right action and (ii) tell
us what makes right actions right. Thus, for example, the utilitarian theory claims:
An act is right if and only if (and because) it maximizes utility.
And the Kantian theory, the Rossian theory, and so on, may be formulated in the same way.
Something similar is true in axiology. Though the form of such theories has been
neglected,26 any program in axiology must at least specify necessary and sufficient conditions
for intrinsic value. Further, if they are to explain the sources of this value, they must specify
the properties that make things good. Thus a complete axiological theory will claim that:
A thing is intrinsically good if and only if (and because) it is B.27
Similarly, I think the correct theory of virtue will claim that:
A state of character is a virtue if and only if (and because) it is C.
And so on.
It is widely accepted that if any moral principle is true, it is true necessarily. Moral
principles make no appeal to contingencies; they do not depend on any matters that are
In fact, my strategy echoes Scanlon (2014). Though Scanlon identifies only certain facts about reasons as
being necessary, we both agree that (i) we should divide moral facts into a pure or privileged class and an
impure class and that (ii) the pure claims may, in some sense, explain the supervenience of the impure moral
facts.
26 I expand on this theme in my “Two Kinds of Value Pluralism.”
27 In fact, this will hold only of unmixed goods—those things that are good but do not have parts that are bad.
For mixed goods, things become more complicated; again I expand on this in “Two Kinds of Value Pluralism.”
25
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accidental. In addition, as Shafer-Landau has stressed, they are philosophical theories.28 And
like other philosophical theories, they appear to be both necessary and a priori.29
Thus the question why do moral principles supervene upon non-moral facts? is answered
immediately: supervenience is vacuous over necessary facts and thus moral principles
supervene on everything. There is nothing to explain.
What of other moral claims?30 The reason they supervene upon the non-moral facts
is, again, immediate: they are connected in exactly the way these principles specify and the
connection holds because these principles are true. Thus, for example, let T be the true theory
of right action and let F1…Fn. be the right making features according to T. Then the deontic
facts must supervene upon the F1…Fn facts. Why? Because T is true and T specifies that
these are the features that the rightness of acts depends upon. Thus both the supervenience
of moral principles and derived truths is explained.31
Of course, we may ask: what makes the true moral theory true? I expect that for the
non-naturalist there is no answer. But this is a burden that the fitting-attitude theorist and
the Moorean must share. For Scanlon, there will be many conditional truths that assert that,
when certain facts obtain, we have reason to have certain attitudes or perform certain

See his (2005).
Of course, I do not expect the naturalist or anti-realist to be moved by such concerns. But this should be
enough, I think, for the non-naturalist—regardless of whether he subscribes to the Moorean view or Scanlon’s
alternative.
30 In fact, there is a kind of gap in this argument, for there may be moral claims that are not principles but are
not contingent (for example, the disjunction of the true theory of right action and the claim that some
particular action is wrong). But if such claims hold necessarily then, again, it is not clear that there is anything to
explain, since their supervenience on the natural facts is also vacuous. Thus the gap is, I hope, easily bridged.
31 I admit this explanation will be unpalatable to Humeans: it assumes that there are necessary connections
between distinct entities (namely natural properties like pleasantness and moral properties like goodness.) But
the Humean cannot, I think be a non-naturalist; the non-naturalist is not a reductionist and thus must take
moral principles as they appear to be—i.e. as necessary connections between moral and non-moral properties.
Thus this concern, however pressing it may be, should not affect the competition between our two systems.
28
29
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actions. And because Scanlon’s program takes reasons to be fundamental, these conditional
truths will not hold in virtue of other truths.32
It appears to me that the general explanation of supervenience given above is at least
as strong as the special explanation postulated by Stratton-Lake and Hooker. I conclude that
their objection is unsound.

§6: Conclusion
I believe that the arguments given to prefer Scanlon’s view do not succeed. In each
case, the competitors are on equal ground or, as in the case of the double counting
argument, the Moorean position comes out just ahead. Ultimately, I find this unsurprising:
the view Scanlon has advanced is, in many ways, like the Moorean account: both construct
moral philosophy out of a single normative notion;33 both deny that this notion may be
explicated in natural terms. The choice between the two will thus be determined by an
overall evaluation of the resulting programs: we must decide whether we wish to build moral
philosophy upon goodness or upon reason.

§7: A Note: Alternatives to Scanlon’s View
There are many fitting-attitude views. I have attended to Scanlon’s: it is the most
popular, and, I think, the most attractive. But some may prefer views like Brentano’s, which
appeal to correctness, or views like Ewing’s, which appeal to fittingness.
Begin with the former. According to Brentano:
x is intrinsically good =df. it is correct to intrinsically love x.

32
33

See Scanlon (2014: 2).
Ibid.
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The double counting argument may thus be recast as follows: according to Brentano, the
natural properties of things make them correct to love; this makes such things good.
According to the Moorean, the natural properties of things make them good, and this makes
them correct to love.
But again, this short description belies the options available to the Moorean: in fact,
he may accept that both the natural and evaluative properties of things make them correct to
love. He may do so by claiming that the goodness of things makes them non-derivatively
correct to love, and that the natural properties of things make them derivatively correct to
love. Thus our verdict of this argument should, I think, mirror our verdict of Scanlon’s
argument. (The argument runs similarly for the accounts advanced by philosophers like
Ewing: we simply replace “correct to love” with “fitting to favor.”)
Our reply to the concern about pluralism is also familiar: Brentano can claim that
plural goods are alike in that they are all correct to love. It is unclear that this is a true
explanation, however, as it appears tautological. If it is an explanation, then we must admit
that the Moorean cannot give such an answer—but he can explain what plural goods have in
common that makes them correct to love. The result is, at worst, a draw. (And mutatis
mutandis for other fitting-attitude views.)
Finally, supervenience. It is perhaps analytic that, if we have a reason to do
something, then there is something that provides that reason; reasons are, in this way,
relational. But fittingness and correctness are not relational. Thus, the claim that,
(i) if something is correct to intrinsically love, then there must be something that
makes this so
is no stronger than the claim that
(ii) if something is intrinsically good, there must be something that makes this so.
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I conclude the supervenience argument cannot be advanced if we do not accept Scanlon’s
program. It is, in this way, different from the other concerns examined.
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CHAPTER VI
A MOOREAN ACCOUNT OF INTRINSIC VALUE
The moral system of the Principia is austere: Moore claims that normative ethics
requires just one fundamental concept, intrinsic goodness.1 Right actions, he says, are those that
maximize the good.2 The virtues are dispositions to perform right actions.3 And other moral
concepts, like praise and blame, can be understood similarly.4
Moore was anxious to explain his fundamental notion. At the center of his view is a
dependence claim: the intrinsic value of a thing is the value it has because of its intrinsic
features.5 6 This principle supports two others: first, that intrinsic goodness is an essential
feature of its bearers;7 and second, that intrinsic goods retain their value, even in isolation.8
Moore completes his account with a seemingly independent claim: if something is
intrinsically good, then it ought to exist, or obtain.9
Some philosophers remain impressed by Moore’s account of intrinsic goodness: it is
endorsed—at least in part—by Chisholm (1981), Feldman (1986), Lemos (1994),
Zimmerman (2001) and Parfit (2011), among others. But, in general, Moore’s view is poorly
understood,10 and frequently criticized: few believe that all his principles are true; an

See Moore (1993: 55, 78, 192).
(1993: 196-197), (2005: 30, 118).
3 (1993: 220-221),
4 (2005: 97-98, 100).
5 (1922: 260), (1993: 21-22).
6 Note, however, that these principles are not supposed to be definitions: Moore repeatedly makes plain that
intrinsic value is a conceptual primitive; see his (1993: 58, 61, 69, 72, 89, 111). Rather, these principles are only
supposed to help us grasp the primitive Moore employs, and to show how it differs from other concepts. I
expand upon this in my “Simply Good: A Defense of the Principia.”
7 (1922: 261)
8 (1993: 236), (2005: 32)
9 (1993: 68).
10 Most cite only one of the principles Moore employed; further they seem to interpret these principles in ways
that do not render them plausible. See e.g. Korsgaard (1983), Kagan (1998), Rabinowicz and RønnowRasmussen (2000), among many others. I do not mean to suggest that these critics are at fault; Moore himself
1
2
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increasing number reject all four.11
I hope to explicate and defend Moore’s position. I take each principle in turn—I
explain the motivation for Moore’s claim, formulate what I take to be the most attractive
version of his principle, and attempt to accommodate extant objections. After, I argue that
Moore’s account should be supplemented. I follow Audi (1997); I suggest a connection
between intrinsic value and reasons for action. This link is independently plausible,
consistent with Moore’s intent and, in conjunction with the principles already stated,
generates a robust criterion of intrinsic value. I conclude by arguing that this link also allows
a new defense of Moore’s claims about the relation between intrinsic value and moral
obligation.
§1: Dependence
The intrinsic value of a thing is the value it has ‘in itself,’ ‘for its own sake,’ or ‘as an
end.’12 These locutions suggest self-dependence. Moore (1922: 260) writes:

was often unclear about the nature, and status, of these principles. But this only makes it more important to
make Moore’s commitments clear, and to provide the best version we can of his claims.
11 In fact, I think some of these philosophers are not speaking of intrinsic value, but of final value—the value a
thing has as an end. They believe that these concepts may come apart; a thing may be good as an end without
being good intrinsically, they claim. I will assume with the orthodoxy that final and intrinsic values coincide.
(See my “The Pen, the Dress, and the Coat: A Confusion in Goodness” and “Ends and Value as an End” for
argument to this effect.) If I am mistaken in this, then my remarks in what follows should be understood to
apply only to the Moorean concept of intrinsic value. (However note that, regardless, we may maintain that if
something is intrinsically good then it has value as an end: even those who wish to separate the concepts admit
intrinsic goods are a subset of final goods. See e.g. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000).)
12 I assume that intrinsic value has a number of formal features. First, intrinsic value is non-relational: the value a
thing has intrinsically is not the value it has for a person or from a particular perspective—but the value a thing has
impartially or simpliciter. Second, intrinsic value is divisible into three concepts: intrinsic goodness, intrinsic
badness and intrinsic neutrality. These categories are exclusive: a thing falls under at most one. Third, intrinsic
goodness and badness are determinables: they come in amounts or degrees. We may define the relations of
being intrinsically better than and being intrinsically worse than in terms of these degrees: a is better than b just in case
(i) a is intrinsically good, and b is intrinsically bad or neutral or (ii) a and b are intrinsically good and a is
intrinsically good to a higher degree than b or (iii) a and b are intrinsically bad and b is intrinsically bad to a
higher degree than a. We reverse the definitions for intrinsically worse than. These relations are transitive,
irreflexive, and anti-symmetric. Fourth, intrinsic goods may be divided into atoms and complexes. A good is atomic
if it is good (bad) but is not good (bad) because of the values of its parts. Much of axiology concerns these
atoms: when hedonists say that pleasure is the only intrinsic good, they mean, presumably, that the only atoms
of intrinsic goodness are episodes of pleasure. But axiology is concerned also with complex goods—things like
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To say that a kind of value is ‘intrinsic’ means merely that the question whether a
thing possesses it, and in what degree it possesses it, depends solely on the intrinsic nature
of the thing in question.13
Thus intrinsic value is, quite literally, value that is intrinsic.
Most claim that Moore’s commitments about dependence can be captured modally;
they say that:
Supervenience: The intrinsic value of a thing supervenes upon its intrinsic features.14 15
The supervenience principle is likely true—but it is too weak to capture Moore’s intent. The
immediate problem is that, since intrinsic value is intrinsic, and since everything supervenes
upon itself, the principle is trivial. We might declare instead that:
Supervenience*: The intrinsic value of a thing supervenes upon its intrinsic properties,
other than its intrinsic value.
But this principle is ad hoc and unsatisfying. (Further, as we shall see, Moore maintains that
the intrinsic values of things are metaphysically essential. Thus the principle is also vacuous:
supervenience is trivial over necessary facts.)
A better interpretation is available. Consider deontology: as Ross (2002) reminds us,
we wish to know not only which acts are right, but why they are right—we want an account of

lives, outcomes, and possible worlds—that have their values because of the values of their parts.
13 See also Moore (1993: 21-22). Moore’s comments here are not stipulative. Nor, however, are they to be
understood as remarks only about how we use the phrase “intrinsic value” in natural language. Rather, I believe
that, like most philosophical accounts of some concept, such as personhood, knowledge, possibility, etc., they
lie somewhere in between: Moore is telling us about a concept we have some intuitive understanding of, and
articulating a view about its nature that lines up with some, but not all, of our pre-theoretical intuitions about it.
14 The idea of supervenience is easy enough: to say that the intrinsic value of a thing supervenes upon its
intrinsic features is to say that there can be no difference in the intrinsic value of a thing without a difference in
its intrinsic properties. But this slogan has been interpreted in many ways. The claim here is commonly
understood to be a claim of strong supervenience—i.e. necessarily, if a thing x is intrinsically valuable to some
degree, n, then there is some intrinsic property G (which may be disjunctive, conjunctive, negative, etc.) such
that, necessarily, anything that is G is good to degree n. See Rønnow-Rasmussen (2011: 10-11).
15 We should note that Moore’s claim is a necessary condition, not a sufficient one: Moore accepts that other
kinds of value, like beauty, may be intrinsic. We will require additional claims if we hope to find a criterion for
intrinsic goodness. Still, some have rejected Moore’s principle even as a merely necessary condition. But it is, I
believe, analytic. Those who reject it are understandable, of course; they seek to claim that the final value of a
thing may depend on its extrinsic properties. See fn. 11.
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the right-making features of acts. The same is true in axiology: a complete axiological theory
cannot merely specify what is intrinsically good; it must also provide an account of the goodmaking features of things—the features that ground and explain the values of goods.16
What features can make a thing intrinsically good? I think the Moorean should claim
that the ultimate explanation of a thing’s intrinsic value must end with some intrinsic
property of that thing. But supervenience is not, I believe, an explanatory relation.17 As
Schaffer (2009) notes, it has the wrong formal features: it is reflexive and non-asymmetric.
But we cannot explain a thing in terms of itself, nor can we explain two things in terms of
each other.
I suggest we appeal instead to the in virtue of relation—the same relation we invoke
when we state theories of right action. We claim that:
Explanation: The intrinsic value of a thing is the value it has in virtue of its intrinsic
features; if something has intrinsic value, then it is good because of these features.
Further, since the in virtue of relation is irreflexive, we do not need to add an exception to this
principle, or invoke the concept we hope to explain.
Moore’s claims about dependence entail another principle that Moore accepted but
did not stress. If the intrinsic value of a thing cannot depend on its extrinsic features, then
the intrinsic value of a thing cannot depend on the values of other things. Thus intrinsic
value is non-derivative—or, as Moore says, ultimate—value.18
However, we must formulate our claims carefully. If we say that:
Strong Non-derivation: If something has intrinsic value, then it cannot have that value

I claim elsewhere that a good-making property is a member of the minimal set S such that for anything that
is intrinsically good either (i) that thing is an atomic good and has its value because it is S or (ii) that thing is a
complex good and has its value because it has a part that is S. See my “Two Kinds of Value Pluralism.”
17 See Kim (1993).
18 See his (1993: 151) and elsewhere.
16
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because something else has value
then we will exclude molecular intrinsic goods—those things that have their values in virtue
of the values of their parts.19 Further, this strong claim does not, in fact, follow from
Moore’s commitments about dependence: having an intrinsically valuable part is an intrinsic
feature of a whole; it should not be rejected as a good-making feature. Instead, we should say
only that:
Weak Non-derivation: If something has intrinsic value, then it cannot have that value
because something outside of it (i.e. something that is not a part of it) has value.
This principle is entailed by the dependence claim Moore suggests. It also explains how
intrinsic goods may ground and explain the value of derivative goods—and thus helps
vindicate Moore’s claim that it is intrinsic value that is fundamental to axiology.

§2: Necessity
Shortly after describing the relation between intrinsic value and intrinsic features,
Moore writes:
It is impossible for what is strictly one and the same thing to possess [intrinsic] value at
one time, or in one set of circumstances, and not to possess it at another; and equally
impossible for it to possess it in one degree at one time, or in one set of circumstances,
and to possess it in a different degree at another, or in a different set. (1922: 261)20
Thus, for Moore:
Necessity: Intrinsic value is essential: if something has intrinsic value, then it has this
Bradley (2013) claims, “we must distinguish intrinsic value from nonderivative value. To illustrate the
distinction, consider that an individual’s life might consist of many instances of happiness; the value of the life
might be derived from the values of the instances of happiness; yet the life itself is intrinsically valuable just as
its parts are.” See also Zimmerman (2010). I think this reply too severe. There is an important connection
between non-derivation and intrinsic value; it is simply captured by the weak principle, rather than the strong
one.
20 We might think that Moore’s commitments are merely temporal: he believes that the intrinsic value of a thing
can never change through time. I think it is true that Moore thought this also—but his claims are clearly modal
as well (thus his quantification here and elsewhere over “circumstances”). Further this is the orthodox
interpretation of Moore’s claims. See Lemos (1994: 11), Bradley (2002), (2006).
19
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value necessarily.
Intrinsic goodness can therefore be characterized not only in terms of the features it
depends upon but also by its modal nature.
However, the necessity claim is not independent; rather, Moore says, it is entailed by
our commitments about dependence:
[I]f x and y have different intrinsic natures, it follows that x cannot be quite strictly
one and the same thing as y; and hence if x and y can have a different intrinsic value,
only where their intrinsic natures are different, it follows that one and the same thing
must always have the same intrinsic value. (1922: 261)
But Moore’s argument proves too much; if sound, it would show that all intrinsic properties
are essential. And this cannot be: some of my intrinsic features—such as my mass, or
shape—may differ from world to world.
Still, though we should reject Moore’s argument, contemporary Mooreans enjoin us
to accept his conclusion. They argue that (i) it is only states of affairs that may be intrinsically
valuable but that (ii) the intrinsic features of a state are essential to it. In this way, Moore’s
claims might be maintained.
Begin with the ontology of value. The Moorean restriction to states of affairs is
familiar, but can—and should—be justified. 21 First, note that the intrinsic value of a thing is
the value it has ‘as an end.’ But a thing cannot have value as an end unless it can be an end or
goal. Further, ends or goals are the kinds of things we can intend to bring about, or make the
case. But it is only states of affairs that we can bring about, or make the case. Thus only states
of affairs can have value as ends—and thus only states of affairs can have intrinsic value.
Second, it seems most (if not all) claims about the intrinsic values of particulars and
universals can be “recast” as claims about the intrinsic values of states of affairs: instead of

This familiar Moorean ontology of value is endorsed by Chisholm (1981), Feldman (1986: 26), Zimmerman
(2001: 33-73) and Bradley (2006), among others.
21
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attributing value to Charlie, we may attribute value to states in which he is a constituent;
instead of attributing value to virtue, we may attribute value to instantiations of virtue.22
Thus, as Feldman (1986) writes, the restriction to states of affairs affords a gain in
“uniformity and coherence.”23
Third (and finally), note that the fundamental objects of axiology—lives, outcomes,
and possible worlds—are states of affairs. Even if we claim that intrinsic value may attach to
other sorts of things, we must admit that states of affairs are the primary concern of
axiology—and since the intrinsic values of states of affairs are essential, Moore’s account
would, at the least, describe this most important kind of value.
Turn next to the intrinsic nature of states of affairs. Most Mooreans claim that
atomic states have few intrinsic features: their intrinsic nature can be explained by merely
noting their constituents—the particulars and universals they contain—and the order of
these constituents.24 But a state of affairs contains the same constituents, in the same order,
in every possible world. And the same is true of those entities created from atomic states.
Further, even if we deny that the constituents of a state exhaust its intrinsic nature
(as perhaps we should), it seems that we may insist that the intrinsic value of a thing depends
only on its constituents. Thus <Charlie is pleased> is good because it is an instance of
happiness, <Sally loves Linus> is good because it is an instance of love, and so forth. But
the constituents of a state are intrinsic and essential to it.25 Further, for any state, S, that
appears to have its intrinsic value in virtue of some external or contingent feature, F, there
will be some wider state that includes this feature as a constituent—in the simple case, this

I develop these ideas further in my “Ends and Value as an End.”
See Feldman (1986: 26).
24 See e.g. Bradley (2002), (2006).
25 See my “Ends and Value as an End” for defense of this claim.
22
23
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will be a state of the form <S is F>. This wider state contains everything necessary to give it
value; it has its value unconditionally.
Thus though Moore’s argument fails, I believe his conclusion was correct: the
intrinsic value of a thing is not only intrinsic, but metaphysically necessary as well.

§3: Isolation
Moore’s best-known commitments are not about dependence or necessity; rather,
they concern isolation. In the Principia we read:
The method which must be employed in order to decide the question ‘What things
have intrinsic value and in what degrees?’ has already been explained…In order to
arrive at a correct decision on the first part of this question, it is necessary to
consider what things are such that, if they existed by themselves, in absolute isolation,
we should yet judge their existence to be good; and, in order to decide upon the
relative degrees of value of different things, we must similarly consider what
comparative value seems to attach to the isolated existence of each. (1993: 236)26
We can say that a thing exists alone or in isolation if it exists without accompaniment—that is,
without anything that is not a part of it. Thus, according to Moore:
Isolation: If something has intrinsic value, then, even if it were to exist in isolation, it
would maintain that value.27 28
Again, the isolation principle is not independent; it follows from Moore’s other
commitments. The necessity principle guarantees that a thing cannot lose its intrinsic value;
thus a fortiori an intrinsic good cannot lose its value if it is the only thing that exists.
Despite this, many Mooreans reject the principle; they think it incoherent.
See also his (2005: 32)
Many philosophers maintain that the only bearers of intrinsic value are finely grained abstract states of affairs
that necessarily exist. See e.g. Chisholm (1981), Feldman (1986), (2000). While I accept that only states of
affairs may have intrinsic value, I do not conceive of states as abstract, or necessarily existing. Still, if we
endorse such views, the isolation principle is easy enough to modify: we will say that, if some state is
intrinsically valuable, then it would maintain its value, even if it were the only state that obtained.
28 Davison presents a sort of inverse of this principle. His test requires us to imagine that everything except the
entity exists. If the world would be judged worse under this condition by a “fully-informed, properly
functioning valuer”, then the entity in question has intrinsic value. See his (2012: 12-13, 35).
26
27
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Zimmerman focuses on Moore’s claim that, for example, pleasure is intrinsically good only if
it would maintain its value in a world that contains “nothing except pleasure”:
What’s incoherent about this is that it is simply impossible that there should be “a
world in which absolutely nothing except pleasure existed.” There are two reasons
for this. First, if there is anything that exists necessarily…then, wherever there is
pleasure, there must also exist these entities. But secondly, even if nothing exists
necessarily, it’s clear that there cannot be (an instance of) pleasure without someone
who experiences it. (2001: 132)
Lemos (1994: 10) and Feldman (1986: 27) express similar concerns.
Note however that Zimmerman’s argument does not, in fact, show that the isolation
principle is false—it shows that it is true but trivial. Moore’s principle is a conditional with a
counterfactual as its consequent, namely:
ISO-C: If a thing were to exist in isolation, then it would maintain its intrinsic value.
If, as these philosophers say, no state of affairs can exist in isolation, then this
counterfactual has a necessarily false antecedent. And a counterfactual with a necessarily
false antecedent holds vacuously. Thus it’s true of everything that, if it were to exist by itself,
it would be intrinsically good. The isolation principle as a whole is therefore toothless: it
specifies a necessary condition that everything meets.
Of course, we might reject the claim that counterfactuals with impossible
antecedents (i.e. counterpossibles) are vacuous and therefore necessarily true.29 And thus we
might claim optimistically that ISO-C is not vacuous or trivial—even if it is impossible for a
thing to exist in isolation.
This position is not, I think, implausible.30 But ultimately I fear it may not be enough.
See Nolan (1997) and Brogaard and Salerno (2013) for a relatively modest revision to the standard LewisStalnaker semantics, which allows counterpossibles to be non-vacuously true.
30 Indeed, we have independent reason to accept that some counterpossibles are not vacuous. For example, it is
implausible to claim that if act utilitarianism is necessarily false (as it very likely is) then both “if act
utilitarianism were true, then it would be obligatory to maximize utility” and “if act utilitarianism were true,
then it would be obligatory to minimize utility” are true. But this is a necessary consequence of the standard
semantics.
29
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For it is not only metaphysically impossible for a state like <Charlie is pleased> to exist
alone, but conceptually incoherent: we must imagine that this state obtains, even without
Charlie.
We might reply that to exist in isolation is not to exist without one’s parts—and
though not all are willing to call the constituents of a state its parts, an analogous rationale
might hold. But even if we accept this response, we will still have to contend with the
necessary connection between states; we will have to imagine a world in which Charlie is
pleased, though no other state of affairs obtains. Thus Charlie cannot instantiate any other
properties. And I must admit that I find this not only impossible but unimaginable.
Of course there might still be a way out. Humeans insist that there are no necessary
connections between entirely distinct entities; they declare that every state can exist without
accompaniment (see Armstrong (1997: 139-147)). Thus we say that either (i) <Charlie is
pleased> can obtain, though no other states obtain or (ii) any state that must obtain with
<Charlie is pleased> is not truly distinct from it. If such a view could succeed, then we could
maintain the isolation principle as formulated.
The Humean reply is therefore attractive. But it is controversial, and I am hesitant to
rely entirely upon it. So let us assume for the sake of argument that, as formulated, Moore’s
principle is truly incoherent. Still, I think we should not abandon Moore’s insight. Though
we cannot accept the ontological version of his principle we can endorse an intentional
version instead; we focus not on worlds where some valuable state exists alone, but on
mental states in which we attend only to the value bearer. When we consider a state of affairs
in this way, we consider only its intrinsic features. But the intrinsic features of a thing
ground—and give rise to—its intrinsic value. Thus when we attend just to the intrinsic
features of a thing, this generates a kind of requirement in us, a requirement to value that
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state for its own sake. That is:
Intentional Isolation: If something is intrinsically good, then the contemplation of it on
its own, apart from anything distinct from it, requires that we value it for its own
sake.
This principle avoids the objections raised: we can consider a thing on its own, even if it
could not exist without accompaniment. In this way, even if we cannot accept Moore’s
claims, we can accommodate the insight that gave rise to them.

§4: Reason, Obligation, and Goodness
The principles examined have a kind of structure: Moore’s claims about goodmaking features support his view about the relation between value, necessity, and isolation.
We might argue that, in conjunction, these principles allow a criterion of intrinsic goodness.
But I worry. Our account says nothing about why intrinsic goodness is a kind of ethical
goodness—and therefore nothing about why intrinsic value is an important concept for
moral philosophy.31 Consider, for example, logical value: the kind of value we attribute to an
argument when we say that it is good, or valid.32 This kind of value is intrinsic, essential, and
persists in isolation (both ontological and intentional).
Of course it is not clear that states of affairs may bear logical value—and so we may
hope to escape this objection on a technicality.33 But the problem remains: Moorean intrinsic
value is supposed to be central to moral philosophy. But nothing in our account guarantees
this. Consider Moore’s remarks:
It cannot be too emphatically insisted that the predicate which…I call ‘good,’ and
which I declare to be indefinable, is only one of the predicates for which the word
See Zimmerman (2001: 24-26) for more on just why this is critical.
I borrow this example from Feldman (1998).
33 Some, however, conceive of propositions as kinds of states of affairs; see e.g. Chisholm (1976).
31
32
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‘good’ is commonly used to stand... [T]he predicate I am concerned with is that sense
of the word ‘good’ which has to the conceptions of ‘right’ and ‘wrong,’ a relation,
which makes it the sense which is of the most fundamental importance for Ethics.
(1993: 3)
How might we support these claims? Of course, they might simply be brute facts—but I
hope for a better answer.
We might think that Moore himself can fill in the lacuna. Moore repeatedly insists
that something is intrinsically good only if it ought to exist, or obtain:
Whenever [one] thinks of ‘intrinsic value,’ or ‘intrinsic worth,’ or says that a thing
‘ought to exist,’ he has before his mind the unique object—the unique property of
things—which I mean by ‘good.’ (1993: 68)
Of course, some things ought to exist for the sake of other things, as when a good has
merely instrumental value. So, like Moore’s other claims, the principle is most plausible if
read as a merely necessary condition. We may say:
Ought to be: If something is intrinsically good, then it ought to exist, or obtain.
But I think this principle is false; some things that are intrinsically good ought not to be.
Consider all those states that are good as ends, but bad as means.34 Suppose, for example,
that Lucy can be happy only if others are miserable. Her happiness may be intrinsically good
but it ought not to obtain.
Further, consider states that are good, but are worse than those that obtain presently.
Imagine that Lucy is presently overjoyed. Now consider the state <Lucy is only moderately
pleased>. This state is good but it would be a mistake to claim that it now ought to obtain.
Still the principle might be salvaged if we weaken the notion of obligation attached.
Ross enjoined us to distinguish between our all-things-considered obligations and our prima
facie duties.35 If we think there is a parallel distinction between what all-things-considered

34
35

See Feldman (1986: 27-29), (1998).
See his (2002: 19-20).
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ought to be and what prima facie ought to be, then we might claim:
Prima Facie Ought to be: If something is intrinsically good, then it prima facie ought to
exist, or obtain.
Perhaps this, then, explains why intrinsic goodness is a kind of ethical value—it is connected
to the deontic concept of what, prima facie, morally ought to be.
Adopting this principle does seem to solve the problem encountered; it excludes e.g.
logical value. But I remain unsatisfied. The concept of what prima facie ought to be is obscure.
Further it does not seem to provide the connection Moore desired; Moore’s program
requires a connection between intrinsic value and what we ought to do. But there is, I think,
no immediate connection between what we ought to do and what ought to be. As Feldman
(1986: 179-184) notes, there are many things, like world peace, that ought to be but that
none of us can achieve. And, further, it may be true that I ought to see to some state of
affairs that ought not to be—as may happen when the best state I can bring about is still
undesirable.
Thus I fear that the connection between intrinsic value and what ought to be is
insufficient to support Moore’s claims about the relation between axiology and deontology.
But Moore did not rely only upon such claims; rather he provided a direct argument:
That the assertion ‘I am morally bound to perform this action’ is identical with the
assertion ‘This action will produce the greatest possible amount of good in the
Universe’…is demonstrably certain. This may, perhaps, be best made evident in the
following way. It is plain that when we assert that a certain action is our absolute
duty, we are asserting that the performance of that action at that time is unique in
respect of value. But no dutiful action can possibly have unique value in the sense
that it is the sole thing of value in the world; since, in that case, every such action
would be the sole good, which is a manifest contradiction. And for the same reason
its value cannot be unique in the sense that it has more intrinsic value than anything
else in the world; since every act of duty would then be the best thing in the world,
which is also a contradiction. It can, therefore, be unique only in the sense that the
whole world would be better, if it be performed, than if any possible alternative were
taken. (1993: 197).
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However, this route to a connection between axiology and deontology is even less
promising. Moore is perhaps correct that if an action is obligatory, then it is, in some sense,
“unique in respect of value.” But why must our duties be unique with respect to intrinsic
value? This is simply assumed—and once it is, the conclusion quickly follows. But while it is
plausible to believe that obligatory actions must be in some sense best, as Zimmerman (2011)
and other have stressed, we cannot simply assume they must be best in Moore’s sense—
especially given the powerful extant objections to Moorean ideal utilitarianism.
Thus though I am eager to support the Moorean system, I conclude that Moore did
not give us sufficient reason to accept the connection he drew between axiology and
deontology. But I hope this link might be established in a different way.
My argument appeals to a kind of rationalism: when something is intrinsically good,
we have some reason to bring it about. Further there is an important connection between
what we have reason to do and our moral obligations. I thus hope to (i) show that intrinsic
value is an ethical kind of value and (ii) advance the broader Moorean program in moral
philosophy.
Begin with the connection between values and reasons. Audi (1997) writes:
[I]f there is anything intrinsically valuable (whether good or bad), then it provides
one kind of basic reason for action, even if not the only kind. Consider pleasure, for
example, and suppose that it is intrinsically good. To grant that it is and then deny
that there is any reason to seek or promote it would be at best inexplicable.
I share Audi’s intuitions; it seems almost unintelligible to claim that some state of affairs is
good in itself but deny that I have any reason to bring it about, if I can. Further Audi’s
claims follow from more general principles about the nature of goods. There is a connection
between what is valuable and what we have reason to value: when something is good, this
gives us a reason to respond to it positively—to value it. Thus, in particular, if something is
intrinsically valuable, then we have intrinsic reason to value it. But to value a thing is not only
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to have a certain attitude towards it; as Scanlon (1998: 95) and Parfit (2011: 38) note,
valuable things require not only positive attitudes but positive actions.
What kind of actions might intrinsic goods require? As I have said, it is only states of
affairs that can be intrinsically good. But states of affairs are the kinds of things we bring
about, see to, or make the case. Thus the pro-actions that intrinsically valuable states of
affairs require must be actions that aim at bringing about these states of affairs.
We arrive, then, at the desired connection: when something is intrinsically good, we
have intrinsic reason to make it the case, if we can.36 And this, I believe, gives us a pro tanto
obligation to do so. We may have other reasons for action, of course—and thus we cannot
establish the full Moorean theory of right action on this basis. But we may still justify
Moore’s claim that there is an important connection between axiology and deontology.
I conclude that all of Moore’s fundamental commitments are defensible: we may
accept that intrinsic value depends only on intrinsic features; that it is essential to its bearers;
that it persists in isolation; and that it is closely linked to right action. Moore’s account is
thus hardly the relic some claim; if we formulate it carefully it is, I think, still plausible—and
still, in many ways, good.

We might object that, when some state of affairs is good, but worse than what obtains presently, we do not
have any reason to bring it about. But I think this mistaken; though we may not have most reason to bring this
state about, we do have intrinsic reason to bring it about. The critic may reply that, if this is so, the same
approach might be used to defend the link Moore drew between what is intrinsically good and what ought to
be: we claim that when some state of affairs is intrinsically good it intrinsically prima facie ought to be. Further,
when some state intrinsically prima facie ought to be, and we can bring it about, then we have a prima facie
obligation to do so. I think this defense plausible enough, but it seems to me to afford little understanding: I
find the notion of what prima facie ought to be obscure, and the notion of what intrinsically prima facie ought to
be only more mysterious. But I find no difficulty in understanding the notion of an intrinsic reason. Thus I
prefer the connection I draw here. But for those who do not share my concerns, we may replace the notion of
what we have intrinsic reason to bring about with the notion of what intrinsically ought to be.
36
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CHAPTER VII
TWO KINDS OF VALUE PLURALISM
Some philosophers say value pluralism is the view that there are many things that are
valuable. Others say value pluralism is the view that there are many values.1 I think these two
descriptions point to two different kinds of pluralism, both of which are present in
contemporary value theory. But these views have not been properly stated, or distinguished.
In what follows, I present and explain these two concepts of value pluralism. I then
defend an account of the distinction between them. I close by showing how this distinction
affects contemporary arguments about pluralism.

§1: Weak Pluralism
Let’s start with the description of value pluralism that is better known. 2 According to
this description, value pluralism is the view that there are many things that are intrinsically
valuable. Conversely, value monism is the view that just one thing is intrinsically valuable.
Thus many philosophers say that hedonism is a form of monism because it implies that
“nothing is good but pleasure.”3 But these philosophers would say that if we believe that
pleasure, justice, and beauty are intrinsically good, then we are value pluralists. Let’s call this
position weak intrinsic value pluralism.
For the former description see e.g. Chisholm (1986: 4) and Lemos (1994: 99); Zimmerman (2001:173) and
Olson (2004) present a modified version. For the latter description see e.g. Stocker (1990: 167-168), Kekes
(1993: 17), Crowder (2004), Hardy (1995), and Nussbaum (2001: xxix).
2 My interest in this paper is pluralism about value. But even within value theory there are many kinds of
pluralism. So I want to restrict what we mean by “value.” In particular I want to discuss pluralism about intrinsic
value, rather than pluralism about extrinsic value, prudential value, legal value, or some other kind of value.
Some philosophers believe that the concept of intrinsic value should be replaced with some other concept,
such as final value. I take no stance on this issue here: the term “final value” may be freely substituted for the
term “intrinsic value.”
3 See e.g. Moore (1993: 111).
1
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There are many historical examples of such views: Moore (1993), Brentano (2009),
and Ross (2002) come to mind. But we can find contemporary cases too: Hurka’s
perfectionist theory implies that knowledge, pleasure, and virtue are intrinsically good.4
Lemos’s theory from his (1994) is another example: it entails that pleasure, knowledge,
beauty, and the flourishing of non-sentient life are intrinsically valuable.
However, trouble arises when we think carefully about why these theories are
supposed to be pluralistic. Philosophers often appeal to the standard description.5 They say
that:
Plural Bearers: An axiology is a form of weak pluralism just in case it entails that more
than one thing is intrinsically good.
But such accounts cannot succeed. One purpose of an axiology is to determine the intrinsic
values of lives, outcomes, and possible worlds. But there are many lives. Even a pessimist
must admit that more than one is intrinsically good. The same problem arises with
outcomes, and possible worlds. Surely, more than one has intrinsic value. But that means
that every axiology is a form of value pluralism.6
Plural Bearers therefore describes an uninteresting, vacuous view. Philosophers must
be talking about something else when they talk about value pluralism.
Some have recognized this problem. They say that views like Moore’s are not forms
of pluralism because they imply that more than one thing is good. Rather, they are forms of
pluralism because they imply that more than one kind of thing is good. Thus Zimmerman
writes in his (2001: 173) that “pluralism with respect to intrinsic value” is the view that
“there are irreducibly many different types of states that have intrinsic value.” And in his

See e.g. his (1998).
Mason (2011) is perhaps the clearest contemporary example.
6 Fred Feldman makes a similar point. See his (2000).
4
5
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(2004: 49) Olson says “pluralism about value is the view that more than one kind of thing
are finally valuable.” 7 8 According to such views:
Plural Kinds: An axiology is a form of weak value pluralism just in case it entails that
there is more than one kind of thing that is intrinsically good. 9
However this revision is also unacceptable. As I’ve said, I believe that an axiology should
determine the intrinsic values of lives, outcomes, and possible worlds. I assume that every
plausible theory will attribute intrinsic value to at least one entity in each of these categories.
But lives, outcomes, and possible worlds are different kinds of things. So this revised
account still implies that every plausible axiology is a form of value pluralism.
I think we must conclude that neither the standard view nor its revision describes the
position philosophers have in mind when they talk about value pluralism. We need a
different account.

§2: Good-making Properties
A complete axiology should be able not only to identify the things that are
intrinsically good but also to explain why those things are good.10 To do so, the theory must
select a set of good-making properties. Intuitively, these are the properties that provide the
ultimate explanation of the goodness of things. More rigorously, we may say that to be a
good-making property is to be a member of the minimal set S such that for anything that is
intrinsically good either (i) that thing is intrinsically good because it instantiates one of the
Olson’s view is about final value, but we can translate. See fn. 2.
See also Darwall (2003), and Lemos (1994: 67, 99).
9 Of course to say that a kind of thing is intrinsically good is not to attribute intrinsic value to the kind itself,
but rather to some member(s) of that kind.
10 There is an important parallel here between axiology and the normative ethics of behavior. As Ross (2002)
reminds us, we do not want to know merely which actions are morally right—we also want to know why. Thus a
theory of right action that gives only necessary and sufficient conditions for the moral rightness of actions is
necessarily incomplete. Such theories need to be supplemented with some claim about what makes right actions
right—some account of the right making features of actions. I believe that something similar is true in axiology.
7
8
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properties in S or (ii) that thing is intrinsically good because it has a part that instantiates one
of the properties in S.11 12
Let me give an example. Imagine that a hedonist makes a list of all the things that he
thinks are intrinsically good. Imagine we ask him about each item on the list: why did you list
this thing? It seems that he would say in each case either (i) it goes on the list because it is an
episode of pleasure or (ii) it goes on the list because it is a complex good, like a life, or
outcome, and it contains episodes of pleasure. When he gets to the end of the list, he will
have explained the goodness of each thing in terms of just one property, being an episode of
pleasure. This is the only property he needs to explain the goodness of things. It is therefore
the only property he takes to be good making.
I believe that the question of value pluralism is not “how many good things are
there?” nor “how many kinds of good things are there?” Those questions are not
substantive. Rather, the question is “how many good-making properties are there?” If we say
there is just one, we are monists. If we say there is more than one, we are pluralists. 13 That is:

It may be necessary to insist that no disjunctive or otherwise gerrymandered value properties appear in the
set, depending on how we understand the because of or in virtue of relation. I do not believe that this restriction is
ad hoc. The good-making properties of a thing should provide the ultimate explanation of its goodness. But the
explanation of a thing’s goodness cannot end with a disjunctive property—a thing instantiates a disjunctive
property only because it instantiates one or more of its disjuncts. For this reason, I do not believe that
disjunctive properties can be good making.
12 We may wish to make an exception for mixed goods, i.e., those things that are intrinsically good but have parts
that are intrinsically bad. We may wish to say that such things are not good because of their good-making
properties, but because their good-making properties defeat their bad-making properties. Thus, on the account
I prefer, hedonism does not entail that containing more pleasure than pain is a good-making property. Rather
hedonism entails that containing more pleasure than pain is the property something has when its good-making
properties outweigh its bad-making properties.
13 Suppose a philosopher puts some things on his list because they are episodes of pleasure containing 10
hedons, others because they are episodes of pleasure containing 11 hedons, and so forth. Is such a person a
value pluralist? No. While our philosopher cites many good-making properties, they are all degrees of the
generic property being an episode of pleasure (containing n hedons). When I speak of good-making properties above, I
mean to speak of these generic properties. We can say then that our philosopher’s theory is a form of monism
because it entails that there is just one generic good-making property, such that all the specific, degreed goodmaking properties cited are degrees of this generic property.
11
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Plural Good Makers: An axiology is a form of weak intrinsic value pluralism just in
case it entails that there is more than one good-making property.14 15
This view gets our test cases right. We have seen that it provides the right verdict about
hedonism. And it provides the right judgments about classic examples, like Moore’s
axiology: it is a form of pluralism, as it should be. Some things would be on Moore’s list
because they are instances of pleasure, some because they are instances of beauty, some
because they are instances of certain kinds of relationships. And we can say something
similar about other examples of weak value pluralism, such as Brentano’s theory, and
Hurka’s view.

§3: Strong Pluralism and Irreducibility
There is another view called “value pluralism.” This is the view philosophers advance
when they say there are irreducibly many values, or kinds of value. And it is the kind of
pluralism Berlin (1969), Kekes (1993), Stocker (1990), and Nussbaum (2001) have
defended.16 I’ll call it strong intrinsic value pluralism.
Strong pluralism is not the view that there are many things that are intrinsically good.
Nor is it the view that there are many reasons why things are intrinsically good. Rather, it is
the view that there are many kinds of intrinsic goodness.

This account is similar to the elegant solution offered by Feldman in his (2000). Indeed, in most cases
Feldman’s account provides the same judgments as the view I describe. But Feldman’s theory is, I think, more
complex. It is also apparently incompatible with a number of increasingly popular theories about intrinsic value,
such as particularism about intrinsic value (i.e. the view that only concrete particulars bear intrinsic value).
Further, it delivers counter-intuitive verdicts when combined with the thesis of organic unities. I therefore
believe that the simpler view I state here is preferable for our purposes.
15 See Hurka (1996) for a similar, though much less detailed, proposal.
16 See also Crowder (2004), Hardy (1995), Galston (2005), Taylor (1982), and Williams (1981).
14
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Strong value pluralists say they find inspiration in Aristotle. Stocker and Kekes point
to Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics: 17
Let us separate, then, things good in themselves from things useful, and consider
whether the former are called good by reference to a single Idea…[If this is true] the
account of the good will have to appear as something identical in them all as that of
whiteness is identical in snow and in white lead. But of honour, wisdom, and pleasure,
just in respect of their goodness, the accounts are distinct and diverse. The good,
therefore, is not some common element answering to one Idea. (1096b18-26)
Strong pluralists interpret this passage as follows. Imagine two very different intrinsic goods.
Perhaps one is an instance of pleasure and the other is an instance of wisdom. We say both
are intrinsically good. But they are good in different ways; there is a kind of goodness the
one has that the other does not.
Strong pluralists therefore claim that there are irreducibly many kinds of intrinsic
goodness.18 Each kind of intrinsic goodness is importantly different from the rest and has its
own unique force. “Intrinsic goodness” is therefore an umbrella term; it picks out a family of
different types of ethical value. Thus we may say that:
Irreducible Values: An axiology is a form of strong value pluralism just in case it entails
that there are at least two irreducible kinds of intrinsic value.
But what does it mean for a kind of intrinsic value to be irreducible? Mason (2015: 9-11)
suggests that a kind of value is irreducible just in case it is unanalyzable—i.e. that it cannot be
broken into more fundamental concepts. Thus, she says, a person will be a strong pluralist if
she believes in many unanalyzable kinds of intrinsic value; she will be a strong monist if she
believes in just one.

See Kekes (1993: 38) and Stocker (1990: 168). Nussbaum’s pluralism is also clearly inspired by Aristotle. See
her (2001: xxix, 294). Others point to the works of Isaiah Berlin. See e.g. Crowder (2004), Hardy (1995), and
Williams (1981).
18 See Stocker, (1990: 169, 184-194), Nussbaum (2001: xxix).
17

95

But such accounts are unacceptable; they confuse meta-ethics with axiology.
Consider philosophers like Brentano (2009) and Zimmerman (2001): they accept only one
kind of intrinsic goodness but hope to analyze this kind of goodness in terms of what it is
intrinsically fitting to favor, or love. All such philosophers will fail to be either monists or
pluralists on Mason’s account, as their conceptions of intrinsic goodness are amenable to
analysis. The same will be true of those who hope to analyze intrinsic goodness in terms of
some natural property or relation.
We should, then, restrict Mason’s view; we should say that a kind of goodness is
irreducible only if it cannot be analyzed in terms of some other kind of goodness. This is the kind of
irreducibility that is critical to axiology. After all, if the monist’s one kind of goodness were
constructed out of others, he would be a pluralist: his one kind of goodness would contain
many.
Thus we may say that a person is a strong monist just in case he believes in just one
kind of intrinsic goodness, and this kind of intrinsic goodness cannot be analyzed in terms of
other kinds of goodness. Conversely, a person is a strong pluralist just in case he believes in
more than one kind of intrinsic goodness, and these kinds of goodness cannot be analyzed
in terms of each other, or in terms of some “super-value.”

§4: Strong Pluralism and Incommensurability
However, strong pluralists do not claim only that there are irreducibly many kinds of
value. These different kinds of value are also supposed to be incommensurable.
To say that two quantities are incommensurable is to say that, in principle, they
cannot be correctly measured on a common scale. For example, heat and intelligence are
incommensurable: there is no way to compare some amount of heat with some amount of

96

intelligence.19 20 The issue is not epistemic: we could know everything about heat and
intelligence but we would still not know how to compare these quantities.
Similarly, to say that values are incommensurable is to say that, in principle, they
cannot be measured on a common scale. Again, the issue is not epistemic: even omniscient
agents could not compare the values of incommensurable goods.
Why do strong pluralists accept value incommensurability? Kekes writes:
The reasons why pluralists suppose that values are incommensurable are, first, that it
does not seem to them that there is a highest value…to which all other values could
always be reasonably subordinated and with reference to which all other values could
be authoritatively ranked. Second, they are also dubious about there being some
medium… in terms of which all the different values could be expressed, quantified,
and compared. (1993: 21)
Galston, another prominent pluralist, suggests that incommensurability is a sufficient
condition for pluralism:
I distinguish value pluralism from various forms of nonpluralist accounts of morality.
A theory is nonpluralist, I say, if it either (a) reduces goods to a single measure of
value or (b) creates a comprehensive hierarchy or ordering among goods. (Theories
that do (a) are usually called monistic.) A moral theory is pluralistic if it does neither
(a) nor (b).
And Stocker goes further, suggesting that to say that values are plural just is to say that they
are incommensurable. 21

I borrow this example from Kelly. See his (2008) for more on incommensurability and value pluralism.
I here follow Kekes (1993), Kelly (2008), and Klocksiem (2011); I assume that value incommensurability entails,
or is equivalent with, value incomparability. To say that the values of two things are incommensurable is to say that
their values cannot be correctly represented on a common scale. To say that the values of two things are
incomparable is to say that these things do not stand in any axiological relation to each other (e.g. better than, worse
than, etc.). I believe that incommensurability and incomparability cannot come apart—at least if we are talking
about intrinsic value. But a defense of this position would take us too far afield. However if we do believe that
these concepts can come apart, then I believe we should link strong pluralism to incomparability, as these
commenters, and others, have done. See Mason (2011) for a review of the use of the term in connection with
this kind of pluralism.
19
20

Stocker writes in his (1997: 203), “I agree that if values are plural, they must be incommensurable, since I
understand ‘plural values’ to mean pretty much the same as ‘incommensurable values’.” Hardy writes similarly
that, “pluralism means…that ultimate human values are irreducibly many; that they cannot be translated into a
single super-value; and that they are sometimes (or often) incommensurable” (1995: 283).
21
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Thus according to many strong pluralists, value incommensurability is closely tied to
pluralism. And for some, incommensurability seems to be a necessary and sufficient
condition for their view.
Begin with the necessity claim. I believe the strong pluralist reasons as follows:
Suppose there are many kinds of intrinsic goodness and that these many kinds of goodness
cannot be analyzed in terms of each other. Then how could there be some scale that
measures these different kinds of value? Such a scale would have to measure at least two
distinct qualities. But this is impossible.22 Indeed, if any comparison between these kinds of
intrinsic goodness were possible then there would have to be some kind of value to compare
them in terms of, some super-value. And this is exactly what the strong pluralist denies.
Now in the other direction: Assume value pluralism is false. Then there is only one
kind of intrinsic goodness and, for any thing that is intrinsically good, it must possess some
determinate amount of this kind of goodness. But two amounts of the same quality can be
compared. Thus if strong value pluralism is false, so is incommensurability. If we take the
contrapositive, we get our result. 23 24
We might then conclude that incommensurability and strong value pluralism are
simply different sides of the same coin. We would claim:

Some might object. They might agree that it is impossible to create a scale that measures more than one
quality but claim that we can always merely sum the quantities in question. E.g. suppose there are two
irreducibly distinct kinds of intrinsic goodness, G1 and G2. Surely, for anything that is intrinsically good, we
can calculate the amount of G1+G2 it has. However a scale of G1+G2 is not a value scale. It is simply a scale
of G1+G2. Likewise, we could construct a scale that measures the sum of a person’s temperature in Fahrenheit
and their I.Q. But such a scale would not measure their temperature, or intelligence. Of course, one could insist
that our G1+G2 scale measures some new kind of value. But this will not help to compare G1 and G2 unless
both kinds of value can be correctly analyzed as mere components of G1+G2. And this is not possible: it
would conflict with our assumption that strong value pluralism is true; G1 and G2 would not be fundamental
kinds of goodness, but simply many components of one “super-value.”
23 It’s for this reason that theorists like Galston (2005: 14) explicitly reject a singular conception of intrinsic
value.
24 Kelly presents a similar argument. See his (2008).
22
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Incommensurable Values: An axiology is a form of strong value pluralism just in case it
entails that there are at least two kinds of intrinsic value that are incommensurable.

§5: An Objection: Incommensurability in a Monist System
Still, we should be careful before endorsing such views. Some might object to the
sufficiency claim: must intrinsic goodness come in determinate amounts? Consider again
views like Brentano (2009). Brentano believes in just one kind of intrinsic goodness. But he
suggests that while both “acts of insight” and “high-minded love” possess the same kind of
intrinsic goodness, there is “no criterion [of judgment] available to us” and thus there may
be “no way of comparing the intrinsic value of acts of insight…with acts of high-minded
love.”25
Of course, Brentano’s point might be merely about what is possible in practice: he
might be claiming only that, while there are facts about how to compare the values of insight
and love, we rarely, if ever, have epistemic access to these facts and so cannot hope to
compare these goods.26
But suppose that Brentano’s claim is not merely epistemic: suppose instead that he
believes that the values of insight and love cannot be compared in principle—that while both
goods possess intrinsic value, they do not possess any determinate amount of value. We
might think this impossible, but we should not be too hasty. Consider classical cases of
vagueness: it may be vague, or indeterminate, whether a person is bald or hirsute, or whether
it is day or twilight. Similarly, we might argue, it could be vague or indeterminate whether
insight is better than love. 27

See his (2009: 29-30, 33).
This is the reading of Brentano I prefer. See (2009: 30), especially the end of §32.
27 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for advancing this powerful objection.
25
26
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If this is possible, then goods need not possess determinate amounts of goodness.
This will undermine our argument for the sufficiency claim. But, more worryingly, it also
shows that the sufficiency claim is false: if it is indeterminate whether insight is better than
love, then we cannot compare these goods—it is neither true nor false that one is better than
another. Thus, pace Incommensurable Values, incommensurability may arise within a
monistic system.
Could it be vague or indeterminate whether insight is better than love? Most claim
that vagueness is merely linguistic.28 The superevaluationist model is pervasive, and attractive;
Lewis (1986: 212) writes:
The only intelligible account of vagueness locates it in our thought and language. The
reason it’s vague where the outback begins is not that there’s this thing, the outback,
with imprecise borders; rather there are many things, with different borders, and
nobody has been fool enough to try to enforce a choice of one of them as the
official referent of the word ‘outback’. Vagueness is semantic indecision.
According to Lewis’s proposal, we have not decided e.g. what we mean by ‘bald’; it is
“hyper-ambiguous”—we might mean having less than 1000 hairs, less than 999, and so
on. We have no reason to be specific, to demand an “official referent.” This hyper-ambiguity
engenders indeterminacy: claims about baldness are neither true nor false when they hold for
only some candidate meanings (or “precisifications”) of ‘bald’. Similarly, then, the claim that
insight is intrinsically better than love could be indeterminate if it holds only according to
some precisifications of ‘intrinsically better than’.
But this is not plausible. While we have no reason to pick a particular candidate for
the meaning of ‘bald’ or ‘twilight,’ we must demand a single referent for ‘intrinsically better
The other popular approach is epistemic: according to such views, in cases of vagueness it is not our language
or the world that is vague or indeterminate—it is rather that we are, in a sense, necessarily ignorant. See
Williamson (1994) for a powerful explication and defense of such views; Sorensen (2012) provides a brief
summary. This approach to vagueness roughly corresponds to the practical, epistemic reading of Brentano
given above. Such views are therefore inapplicable to the critic of Incommensurable Values—
incommensurability, as we have understood it, is not epistemic.
28
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than’—it plays a critical role in axiology, practical reasoning, and deontology; hyperambiguity here would shake the foundations of these fields. Further, while it is easy to
specify the different candidate meanings for ‘bald’ or ‘twilight’ this is not true in our case;
what are the relevant candidates for ‘intrinsically better than’?29
So the orthodox linguistic accounts of vagueness will not allow us to claim that it is
vague or indeterminate whether insight is better than love. The alternative is metaphysical—we
may say that it is indeterminate whether insight is better than love because the relation
intrinsically better than is itself vague. But what would it mean for a universal like better than to
be vague, or indeterminate? Williamson (1994: 251) suggests that a relation might be vague if
the relata can stand in the relation to a degree.30 This is not to say that the relata entirely
instantiates some determinate of the relation—like being intrinsically better by degree n—but that
the relata may only instantiate the determinable intrinsically better than relation to some degree.
I am inclined, however, to side with the orthodoxy: I think this kind of vagueness is
unintelligible.31 Russell (1923) writes, “nothing is more or less than what it is, or to a certain
extent possessed of the properties which it possesses.” The same, I believe, holds of

Though I have long believed these concerns to be decisive, I now recognize that a powerful objection is
available. A good a may better than another, b just in case (i) a is intrinsically good, and b is intrinsically bad or
neutral or (ii) a and b are intrinsically good and a is intrinsically good to a higher degree than b or (iii) a and b are
intrinsically bad and b is intrinsically bad to a higher degree than a. Thus, sometimes, claims that employ “better
than” hold in virtue of claims about the particular degrees to which things are good. But these claims may be
vague: though, in a formal language, we can employ predicates such as “being intrinsically good to degree 1”
and so on, in natural language we must muddle through with more imprecise locutions such as “pretty good”
and the like. The critic may rightly insist that these terms are hyper-ambiguous. In this way, we may argue that a
linguistic explanation for the vagueness of “better than” may still hold. (I am thankful to Phillip Bricker for
raising this objection.) Of course, these concerns might be ameliorated by introducing more precise predicates–
as we do for other quantities, such as mass and the like. However if this is not enough to undermine this
concern—and I am not sure that it is—then I recommend that we accept the weaker view I suggest at the end
of this section: we must admit that incommensurability is a necessary, but not sufficient, criterion for strong
pluralism.
30 To be clear, Williamson does not believe in vagueness of this kind—he is only trying to make sense of it.
31 Dummett (1975), for example, writes, “the notion that things might actually be vague, as well as being vaguely
described, is not properly intelligible.” This view is widely held—see e.g. Lewis (1993) and Sainsbury (1994).
29
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relations.32 I therefore accept Incommensurable Values, and our argument in favor of it: I
claim that if a thing is intrinsically good, it must possess some determinate amount of
goodness.
But of course some philosophers are willing to accept this kind of ontological
vagueness.33 I cannot hope to dissuade those who endorse such views here. For such
readers, I suggest that we depart from the claims of Stocker and other like-minded pluralists
and reject the sufficiency condition: we will say only that if someone is a strong pluralist,
then she must believe in value incommensurability. This will not affect our first criterion: we
can still say that a person is a strong pluralist just in case she believes there are irreducibly
many kinds of intrinsic goodness. And in conjunction with the necessity claim of
Incommensurable Values, this will be enough: we will have a rich understanding of the
strong pluralist view, and we will be able to explain why it has been so closely connected
with value incommensurability.

§6: Weak and Strong Pluralism
I have presented two different kinds of value pluralism. One view says that there are
at least two properties that can make a thing intrinsically good; the other says that there are
at least two irreducible kinds of intrinsic goodness. It is critical to keep these theories apart;
they have radically different entailments.
For example, as we have said, strong pluralism necessitates value
incommensurability. This requires a non-standard model of rational choice: if this kind of
pluralism is true then we can no longer weigh or even compare the values of many of our
This worry seems especially acute in our case. Suppose that it is indeterminate whether insight is better than
love because the better than relation is vague. To what degree, then, do these two goods stand in the better than
relation? .5? .6? How could we ever answer such questions, even in principle?
33 See e.g. Colyvan (2001) and Barnes and Williams (2011).
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ends. Of course sometimes our goals may be compatible, or they may possess only one kind
of value. But problems will necessarily reappear: our ends will sometimes be inconsistent,
and their values incommensurable. In such cases, it is unclear how we could act rationally.
Strong pluralists argue that such problems need not defeat their theory; Isaiah Berlin
(1969) is here foundational. He writes:
Where ultimate values are irreconcilable, clear solutions cannot, in principle, be
found. To decide rationally in such situations is to decide in the light of general
ideals, the over-all pattern of life pursued by a group or society.
Galston (2005: 15) and Kekes (1993: 76) make similar comments—although they appeal not
to the life patterns of groups but to “shared human experience” or the “traditions and
conceptions” we regard as acceptable. According to all such views, it is these shared
standards that will, somehow, help us rank our ends. But there is nothing normative in such
theories: they appeal only to the standards we in fact have.34 Further they ask these standards to
do the impossible: to reasonably compare our ends without comparing their values.
Strong pluralism is also inconsistent with many standard accounts of right action.
Any view that enjoins us to maximize the good, like Moore’s ideal utilitarianism, is
incoherent if strong pluralism is true. This is because it is not possible to maximize
incommensurable values. Thus nearly all consequentialist views will be eliminated. A similar
argument will eliminate moderate views, like Ross’s.
Strong pluralism is therefore a revolutionary—and costly—position. But weak
pluralism has none of these costs: it is consistent with a standard account of rational choice,
and with all traditional accounts of right action.

Kekes (1993: 78) nearly admit this; he says that such rankings will be “relative but not arbitrary.” They are
not arbitrary because these conceptions are open to rational criticism “at least on one ground; namely, on how
they compare with respect to the realization of primary [i.e. intrinsic] values.” But such criticism would itself be
groundless unless we can compare the values of the things these conceptions rank.
34

103

These two views are, then, very different. But they have nonetheless been
confused—and this confusion has influenced the contemporary dialectic about pluralism.
For example, in his (1993) Kekes hopes to show that strong pluralism is superior to its
competitors. 35 He begins by focusing on hedonistic theories. He is moved by Millian
concerns: he thinks pleasures of the same intensity and duration may differ in value, due to
their quality. But Kekes rejects Mill’s theory too.36 He moves to preferentism but cannot
accept this either: persons can have “perverse, trivial, foolish, and self-destructive
preferences” and the satisfaction of such preferences is not intrinsically good.37 So, Kekes
says, preferentism fails as well.
But from the failure of these two theories, Kekes concludes that we have good
reason to accept “the incompatibility and incommensurability of conflicting values”—that is,
good reason to accept strong pluralism. 38 However we can see now that such arguments
cannot succeed. Classical hedonism and preferentism are not the only alternatives to strong
pluralism. These views are monistic in both senses: they postulate one kind of intrinsic
goodness and one property that gives a thing that kind of goodness. But we need not
endorse such a theory to reject strong pluralism.39 We could accept a view like Moore’s—a
view that is a form of weak pluralism but not strong pluralism. Further, as we have discussed,
views like Moore’s can be combined with a thesis of practical (or epistemic)
incommensurability. According to such theses, while there are always facts about how the

See Kekes (1993: 67-74). Kekes does consider other forms of “monism” before coming to this conclusion,
but these views are drastically different from the kind of views that philosophers like Moore, Hurka, and
Lemos endorse.
36 Kekes (1993: 67-68).
37 Kekes (1993: 69).
38 Kekes (1993: 73).
39 Of course, I do not mean to assent to the idea that by merely giving reason to reject classical hedonism and
preferentism, Kekes has thereby shown that no theory that is monistic in both senses may succeed. Novel
forms of hedonism and preferentism have been developed, and these theories are much more difficult to
defeat. See e.g. the hedonistic views developed in Feldman’s (2004).
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values of goods compare, we do not have reliable epistemic access to these facts. This will
allow us to simulate much of the pluralist view, without committing ourselves to the
heavyweight kind of incommensurability that the strong pluralist accepts. We may therefore
help ourselves to the rich view of the moral life that the pluralist desires, without many of
the costs.
Kekes, like most strong pluralists, never addresses such views. Further, those
pluralists who do discuss views like Moore’s seem to misunderstand them. Stocker writes in
the introduction to his (1990) that he was “convinced by G.E. Moore…of the plurality and
incommensurability of moral considerations.” But Moore never accepts the kind of
pluralism Stocker is interested in. In fact, he explicitly rejects it in his (1942: 583). And rightly
so: the kind of pluralism Stocker has in mind would rule out Moore’s own signature view
about moral obligation.40
There are other places where the distinction drawn here may be useful. But I hope
this is sufficient to show just how important it is to distinguish these two kinds of views.

It is also critical to state these views carefully; doing so may help dissolve contemporary disputes. Feldman’s
(2004) is a good example. While Feldman’s views are clearly not forms of strong pluralism, he claims that they
are not forms of weak pluralism either. But Mason (2011) alleges “Feldman’s view is not a monist one.” And
Olsaretti (2007) provides a similar argument. If we apply our account of weak value pluralism we may hope to
obtain a clear verdict. The same is true of historical debates: at least part of Moore’s famous attack on qualified
hedonism is his claim that Mill’s theory is, in fact, a kind of pluralism and therefore cannot be a pure form of
hedonism. Our theory can help us decide if we want to agree with Moore, or reject his complaint.
40
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